Magistri Petri Lombardi
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Sententiarum Quatuor Libri

LIBER PRIMUS SENTENTIARUM.

DE DEI UNITATE ET TRINITATE

DISTINCTIO XXII.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 388-389.
Cum Notitiis Editorum Quaracchi

Cap. I.

De nominum differentia, quibus utimur loquentes de Deo.

Post praedicta disserendum nobis videtur de nominum diversitate, quibus loquentes de Unitate ac Trinitate ineffabili utimur. Deinde ostendendum[1] est, quibus modis de ea aliquid dicatur. « Illud ergo praecipue teneamus, quaedam esse nomina distincte ad singulas personas pertinentia, ut ait Augustinus in octavo libro de Trinitate,[2] quae de singulis tantum dicuntur personis; quaedam vero unitatem essentiae significantia sunt quae et de singulis singillatim et de omnibus communiter dicuntur; alia vero sunt, quae translative et per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur ». Unde Ambrosius in secundo libro de Trinitate[3] ait: « Quo purius niteat fides, tripartita videtur derivanda distinctio. Sunt enim nomina quaedam, quae evidenter proprietatem deitatis ostendunt; et sunt quaedam, quae perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt unitatem; alia vero sunt, quae translative et per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur. Proprietatis itaque indicia sunt generatio, Filius, Verbum et huiusmodi; unitatis vero aeternae sapientiae, virtus, veritas et huiusmodi; similitudinis vero splendor, character, speculum et huiusmodi ».

Master Peter Lombard
Archbishop of Paris

The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTION 22

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 388-389.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Chapter I.

On the difference of the names, which we use speaking of God.

After the aforesaid, it seems to us that there must be an orderly discussion [disserendum] of the diversity of names, which we use speaking of the Unity and ineffable Trinity. Then it must be shown,[1] in what manners any is said of It. « Therefore, that do we chiefly hold, that there are certain names pertaining distinctly to each Person [singulas personas], as (St.) Augustine says in the eighth book <u>On the Trinity</u>,[2] which are only said of each Person; but there are certain ones signifying the Unity of the Essence, which are said both of Each singly [singulis singillatim] and of All commonly; however, there are others, which are said of God in a transferred manner [translative] and through a similitude ». Whence (St.) Ambrose in (his) second book <u>On the Trinity</u>[3] says: « It seems a tripartite distinction (is) to be derived, whereby the Faith may more purely shine. For there are certain names, which evidently show the property of the Deity; and there are certain ones, which express the perspicuous Unity of the Divine Majesty; but there are others, which are said of God in a transferred manner and through a similitude. And so the identifying marks [indicia] of property are "generation", "the Son", "the Word" and (terms) of this kind; but of the Unity of the Eternal Wisdom, "virtue", "truth" and (terms) of this kind; however, (the terms pertaining to) a

similitude (are) “character”, “mirror”, and (those) of this kind ».

Cap. II.

De his quae temporaliter Deo conveniunt et relative dicuntur.

His addiciendum est, quaedam etiam esse nomina, ut Augustinus ait in quinto libro de Trinitate,[4] quae ex tempore Deo conveniunt et relative ad creaturam dicuntur, quorum quaedam de omnibus dicuntur personis, ut dominus, creator, refugium; quaedam autem non de omnibus, ut donatus, datus, missus.

Chapter II.

On those which convene with God temporally and are said relatively.

To these must be added, that there are also certain names, as (St.) Augustine say in the fifth book On the Trinity,[4] which convene with God on account of time and are said relatively regarding a creature, certain ones of which are said of all the Persons, such as “Lord”, “Creator”, “Refuge”; but certain ones not of All, such as “granted”, “given”, “sent”.

Cap. III.

De hoc nomine quod est trinitas.

Praeterea est unum nomen, quod de nulla persona singillatim dicitur, sed de omnibus simul, id est *trinitas*, quod non dicitur secundum substantiam, sed quasi collectivum pluralitatem designat personarum.

Sunt etiam quaedam nomina, quae ex tempore Deo conveniunt nec relative dicuntur, ut incarnatus, humanatus et huiusmodi. Ecce sex nominum differentias assignavimus, quibus utimur loquentes de Deo, de quibus singulis agendum est.

Chapter III

On this name which is “Trinity”.

Moreover, there is one name, which is said of no Person singly, but of All together, that is “*Trinity*”, which is not said according to substance, but designates as a quasi collective the plurality of the Persons.

There are also certain names, which convene with God in time and are not said relatively, such as “incarnate”, “made man” [humanatus] and (those) of this kind. Behold, we have assigned the six differences of the names, which we use speaking of God, concerning each of which one must now deal.

Cap. IV.

De his quae proprie ad singulas personas pertinent, et de his quae unitatem essentiae significant.

Sciendum est igitur, quod illa quae proprie ad singulas personas pertinent, relative ad invicem dicuntur, sicut Pater et Filius, et utriusque Donum, Spiritus sanctus. Ea vero, quae unitatem essentiae significant, ad se dicuntur. Et ea quae ad se dicuntur, substantialiter utique dicuntur et de omnibus communiter et de singulis singillatim dicuntur personis et singulariter, non pluraliter accipiuntur in summa, ut Deus, bonus, potens, magnus et huiusmodi. Quae autem relative dicuntur substantialiter non dicuntur. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate[5] ita ait: « Quidquid ad se dicitur, praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas substantialiter dicitur; quod autem ad aliquid dicitur, non substantialiter,

Chapter IV

On those which properly pertain to the each Person, and on those which signify the Unity of the Essence.

It must be known, therefore, that those which properly pertain to each Person, are said relatively to one another [ad invicem], just as “the Father” and “the Son”, and the Gift of Each, “the Holy Spirit”. However, those, which signify the Unity of the Essence, are said regarding It [ad se]. And those, which are said regarding It, are indeed said substantially and of All commonly and are said of each Person singly and are accepted singularly, not plurally, in the Most High (Essence), such as “God”, “good”, “powerful”, “great” and (those) of this kind. But those which are said relatively are not said substantially. Whence (St.) Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity[5] thus says: « Whatever is said

sed relative dicitur. Tantaque est vis eiusdem substantiae in Patre et Filio et Spiritu sancto, ut quidquid de singulis ad se ipsos dicitur, non pluraliter in summa, sed singulariter accipiatur. Dicimus enim: Pater est Deus, Filius est Deus, et Spiritus sanctus est Deus, quod secundum substantiam dici nemo dubitat; non tamen dicimus, hanc Trinitatem esse tres deos, sed unum Deum. Ita dicitur Pater magnus, Filius magnus et Spiritus sanctus magnus: non tamen tres magni, sed unus magnus. Ita etiam[6] omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus sanctus; non tamen tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens. Quidquid ergo ad se ipsum dicitur, Deus et de singulis personis similiter dicitur, et simul de ipsa Trinitate, non pluraliter, sed singulariter dicitur. Et quoniam non est aliud Deo *esse* et aliud *magnum esse*, sed hoc idem est illi *esse* quod est *magnum esse*, propterea, sicut non dicimus tres essentias, sic non dicimus tres magnitudines, sed unam essentiam et unam magnitudinem ».

regarding It, is said (to be) substantially that most outstanding and Divine Sublimity; but what is said regarding something, not substantially, is said relatively. And so great is the force of the same Substance in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, that whatever is said of Each regarding Themselves, is not accepted in the Most High (Unity) plurally, but singularly. For we say: 'the Father is God', 'the Son is God', and 'the Holy Spirit is God', which no one doubts is said according to the Substance; yet we do not say, that the Trinity is three gods, but the One God. Thus the Father is said (to be) Great, the Son Great, the Holy Spirit Great: yet (it is not said that there are) three Great Ones, but One Great One. Thus also[6] "the Omnipotent Father", "the Omnipotent Son", "the Omnipotent Holy Spirit"; yet not three Omnipotents, but One Omnipotent. Whatever, therefore is said regarding It Itself, is said (to be) God and of each Person similarly. And since it is not one (thing) for God *to be* and another *to be great* [magnum esse], but for Him *to be* is the same as is *to be great*, on this account, just as we do not say (that there are) three Essences, so we do not say (that there are) three Greatnesses [magnitudines], but One Essence and One Greatness ».

« Deus enim non est magnus ea magnitudine, quae non est quod ipse, ut quasi particeps eius sit; alioquin maior esset illa magnitudo quam Deus; Deo autem non est aliquid maius: ea igitur mangitudine magnus est, qua ipse est. Ideoque nec tres magnitudines dicimus, sed unam magnitudinem, nec tres magnos, sed . . .

« For God is not great by that magnitude, which is not that which He Himself (is), to be a quasi participant of it; otherwise that magnitude would be greater than God; but there is nothing greater than God: therefore He is great by that magnitude, by which He is. And for that reason we do not say (that there are) three Greatnesses, but one Greatness, nor three Great Ones, but . . .

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[1] Vat. et plures edd. contra codd. *demonstrandum*.
[2] In prooemio. — De his tribus modis significationis verborum loquitur ibid. V. c. 8. n. 9. — Hic et in sequentibus tam codd. quam edd. promiscue scribunt modo *sigillatim*, modo *singillatim*, modo *singulatim*.
[3] Sive de Fide ad Gratianum. Prolog. n. 2; sed pro verbis: *nomina quaedam, quae evidenter* legitur *evidentia indicia, quae* etc.; tamen, ut notant Maurini, quidam cod. legit cum Magistro: *Sunt enim nomina quaedam*, et ipse Magister post *Proprietates itaque* adhibet vocem *indicia*. Propositionem: *alia vero sunt, quae translative*, Magister addit, dum Ambrosius dicit: *Sunt quae similitudinem Patris et Filii scil. ostendunt*. Vat. et plures edd. post vocem

[1] The Vatican edition and very many editions, contrary to the codices, read *demonstrated* [demonstrandum].
[2] In the Foreword. — On these three manners of words' signification, (St. Augustine) speaks in ibid., Bk. V, ch. 8, n. 9. — Here and in the following (propositions), both the codices as well as the editions, indiscriminately write sometimes *affixed with seals* [sigillatim], sometimes *singly* [singillatim], sometimes *singledly* [singulatim].
[3] Or On Faith to Gratian, Prologue n. 2; but for the words: *certain names, which evidently* [nomina quaedam, quae evidenter] there is read *evident identifying marks, which* [evidentia indicia, quae]; yet as the Maurini note, a certain codex reads with

proprietatem addunt *personamque* contra originale et codd. Denique edd. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9 contra contextum legunt *exprimunt veritatem* loco *exprimunt unitatem*.

[4] Cap. 16. n. 17. — Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 8, 9 paulo ante post *quaedam* omittunt *etiam*.

[5] Cap. 8. n. 9. — Fere omnes edd. contra codd. *ita*.

[6] Sola Vat. et male *enim*, ed. 1 et codd. A B C E *et*, Augustinus *itaque*, cod. D *Ita omnipotens*. Infra Vat. et ed. 6 ante *idem est* omittunt *hoc*, quod habet etiam Augustinus.

Master (Peter): *For there are certain names* [Sunt enim nomina quaedam], and Master (Peter) Himself after *And so* [Proprietates itaque] employs the word *identifying marks* [indicia]. The proposition: *but there are others, which are said of God in a transferred manner* etc. [alia vero sunt, quae translative etc.], Master (Peter) adds, while (St.) Ambrose rather said: *There are those which, that is, show the similitude of the Father and the Son* [Sunt quae similitudinem Patris et Filii scil. ostendunt]. The Vatican edition and very many editions read *the property and the Person of the Deity* [proprietatem personamque deitatis] for *the property of the Deity* [proprietatem deitatis], contrary to the original and the codices. Then editions 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, contrary to the context read *express the perspicuous truth* [exprimunt veritatem] in place of *express the perspicuous Unity* [exprimunt unitatem].

[4] Chapter 16, n. 17. — The Vatican edition and editions 4, 5, 8, and 9, a little before this at *certain* [quaedam] omit *also* [etiam].

[5] Chapter 8, n. 9. — Nearly all the editions, contrary to the codices, have *thus* [ita].

[6] Only the Vatican edition also reads badly *For thus* [Ita enim], edition 1 and codices A B C and E have *Thus also* [Ita et], (St.) Augustine has *And so thus* [Ita itaque], codex D has *Thus* [Ita]. Below the Vatican edition and edition 6, before *same* [idem] omit *the* [hoc], which even (St.) Augustine has.

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p. 389

unum magnum, quia non participatione magnitudinis Deus magnus est, sed se ipso magno magnus est, quia ipse est sua magnitudo. Ita et de bonitate et aeternitate et omnipotentia Dei dicendum est et de omnibus omnino, quae de Deo possunt pornuntiari substantialiter, quibus ad se ispum dicitur, non translative ac per similitudinem, sed proprie, si tamen de illo proprie aliquid ore hominis dici potest ». Ecce aperte docuit, quod nomina unitatem divinae maiestatis significantia et ad se dicuntur de Deo, id est sine relatione, et de omnibus personis communiter et de singulis divisim dicuntur nec pluraliter, sed singulariter in summa accipiuntur. Illa vero nomina, quae proprie ad singulas pertinent personas, relative, non substantialiter dicuntur. « Quod enim proprie singula in Trinitate persona dicitur, ut ait Augustinus in eodem,[2] nullo modo ad se ipsam, sed ad aliam invicem vel ad creaturam dicitur: et ideo relative, non substantialtier dici manifestum est ».

One Great One, because not by a participation in magnitude is God great, but by His Great Self [se ipso magno] He is great, because He is His own Greatness. Thus must it be said both of the goodness and eternity and omnipotence of God and of all (names) entirely, which can be substantially pronounced of God, by which one speaks [dicitur] regarding Him, not in a transferred manner and through a similitude, but properly, if, however, anything can be said of Him properly by the mouth of man ».[1] Behold, he has openly taught, that names signifying the Unity of the Divine Majesty both are said of God regarding Himself, that is without a relation, and of all the Persons commonly and are said of Each separately [singulis divisim], and are not plurally, but singularly accepted in the Most High. However, those names, which properly pertain to each Person, relatively, are not said substantially « For what is properly said according to each Person in the Trinity », as (St.) Augustine says in the same (book),[2] « is in no manner said relatively regarding (the Person)

Himself, but (rather) regarding the other (Person) in the relation [ad aliam invicem] and/or regarding a creature: and for that reason it is manifest that they are said relatively, not substantially ».

[1] Ex eodem loc. cit. c. 10. n. 11.
[2] Cap. 11.n. 12. — Vat. et edd. 3, 4, 9 male *se ipsum* pro *se ipsam*.

[1] From the same loc. cit., ch. 10, n. 11.
[2] Chapter 11,n. 12. — The Vatican edition and editions 3, 4, and 9, read badly *Each Himself* [se ipsum] for *(the Person) Himself* [se ipsam].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII.

De fide Trinitatis, quatenus credita et intellecta per catholicos sermones exprimitur, et quidem de nominibus divinis in generali.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 389-392.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXII

On Faith in the Trinity, to the extent that having been believed and understood It is expressed through the discourse of Catholics, and indeed on the Divine Names in general.

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 389-392.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Post praedicta disserendum nobis videtur de nominum diversitate.

After the aforesaid, it seems to us that there must be an orderly discussion of the diversity etc.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Supra egit Magister de sacra Trinitate,

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Above Master (Peter) dealt with the Sacred

secundum quod catholice creditur et intelligitur. In hac parte agit de ea, secundum quod credita et intellecta per catholicos sermones exprimitur. Unde, sicut ipse Magister dicit in littera, intendit hic agere de nominum divinorum diversitate. Et haec pars habet duas partes. In *prima* parte determinat[1] de nominibus divinis in generali; in *secunda* in speciali, et hoc distinctione vigesima tertia: *Praedictis tamen adiiciendum est, quod cum omnia nomina* etc.

Trinity, according to which It is believed and understood in a Catholic manner. In this part he deals with It, according to which having been believed and understood It is expressed through the discourse of Catholics [per catholicos sermones]. Whence, just as Master (Peter) himself says in the text, he intends here to deal with the diversity of the Divine Names. And this part has two parts. In the *first* part (Master Peter)[1] makes a determination [determinat] concerning the Divine Names in general; in the *second* in particular [speciali], and this in the Twenty-Third Distinction: *However, to the aforesaid it must be added, that since all names* etc..

Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima parte ponit Magister multiplices nominum divinorum differentias; in secunda omnes reducit ad duas, secundum illud Boethii in libro Divisionum,[2] quod omnis divisio est bimembris vel ad bimembrem reducibilis, et hoc ibi: *Sciendum est igitur, quod illa quae proprie pertinent*.

The *first* part is divided into two. In the first part Master (Peter) posits the manifold differences of the Divine Names; in the second he reduces all to two, according that (saying) of (St. Severinus) Boethius, in the book Of Divisions,[2] that every division is bipartite [bimembris] and/or reducible to a bipartite, and this there (where he says): *It must be known, therefore, that those which properly pertain* etc..

Item, prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima ponit Magister differentias nominum divinorum secundum Augustinum et secundum Ambrosium. In secunda ad maiorem explanationem superaddit alias tres differentias, ibi, secundo capitulo:[3] *His adiiciendum est, quaedam nomina etiam esse* etc.

Likewise, the first part is divided into two. In the first Master (Peter) posits the differences of the Divine Names according to (St.) Augustine and according to (St.) Ambrose. In the second, for a greater explanation, he adds three other differences, there in the second chapter (where he says):[3] *To these must be added, that there are also certain names* etc..

Similiter secunda pars, in qua reducit haec membra ad duo, habet duas partes.[4] In prima ostendit, quod nomina in divinis quaedam dicuntur relative, et haec pertinent ad personas; quaedam ad se, et haec dicuntur de omnibus simul. In secunda ostendit, hoc esse verum, ibi: *Deus enim non est magnus ea magnitudine*.

Similarly, the second part, in which he reduces these members to two, has two parts.[4] In the first he shows, that certain names among the divine are said relatively, and these pertain to the Persons; certain ones regarding (the Deity) Itself [ad se], and these are said of All together. In the second he shows, that this is true, there (where he says): *For God is not great by that magnitude* etc..

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

Ad intelligentiam eorum quae in hac parte dicuntur de nominibus divinis, quatuor quaeruntur.

Primo, quaeritur, utrum Deus sit nominabilis.

Secundo, utrum uno[5] solo nomine, vel pluribus debeat nominari.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

For an understanding of those which are said in this part concerning the Divine Names, four (things) are asked.

First there is asked, whether God is nameable.

Second, whether He ought to be named by only one[5] name, and/or with many.

Tertio, supposito quod plura sint nomina divina, quaeritur, utrum omnia dicantur translative, aut[6] etiam quaedam dicantur proprie.

Quarto, utrum nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam, an etiam aliquo[7] alio modo.

Third, having supposed that there are many Divine Names, there is asked, whether all are said in a transferred manner, or (whether)[6] certain ones are said properly.

Fourth, whether names are said of God according to the Substance, or whether also in some[7] other manner.

[1] Supple cum cod. Z et ed. 1 *Magister*.
[2] Circa medium: « Divisio quoque, nominibus positis, quoniam semper in duos terminos sectatur » etc. Et paulo post: « ita ergo divisio omnis in gemina secaretur, si speciebus et differentiis vocabula non deessent ».
[3] In Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 deest *secundo capitulo*.
[4] Ed. 1 *particulas*.
[5] Ex fere omnibus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus male omissum *uno*.
[6] Ed. 1 *an*.
[7] Plures codd. ut A F G H K T etc. *aliqua*, quam lectionem etiam ed. 1 habet et insuper post *utrum* addit bene *omnia*.

[1] Supply together with codex Z and edition 1, *Master (Peter)* [Magister].
[2] About the middle: « A division too, with the names posited, since it is always separated [sectatur] into two terms » etc.. And a little after this: « therefore, thus every division would be separated into twins, if for the species and differences the words were not lacking ».
[3] In the Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, there is lacking *in the second chapter* [secundo capitulo].
[4] Edition 1 has *sub-parts* [particulas].
[5] From nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied the badly omitted *one* [uno].
[6] Edition 1 reads *or whether* [an] for *or (whether)* [aut].
[7] Very many codices, such as A F G H K T etc., have *some in another manner* [aliqua alio modo], which reading edition 1 also has, which moreover after *whether* [utrum] adds well *all* [omnia].

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p. 390

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

De nominibus divinis.

QUAESTIO I.

Utrum Deus sit nominabilis.

Circa primum, quod Deus sit innominabilis, ostenditur *auctoritatibus* et *rationibus* sic: 1. Dionysius de Divnis Nominibus:[1] « Deum neque dicere neque intelligere possibile est ». Et iterum: « Dei neque nomen est neque verbum neque ratio neque opinio neque phantasia »: ergo Deus est omnino innominabilis.

2. Item, Philosophus in libro de Causis:[2] « Prima causa superior est omni narratione »; sed quod est superius omni narratione est inenarrabile, et omne tale innominabile: ergo etc.

3. Item, *ratione* ostenditur sic: *nomen* proportionem et similitudinem aliquam habet ad nominatum, ut vox ad

ARTICLE SOLE

On the Divine Names.

QUESTION 1

Whether God is nameable.

About the first, that God is un-nameable, is shown *by authorities* and *by reasons* thus: 1. (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite says) On the Divine Names:[1] « It is possible neither to speak of nor to understand God ». And again: « Of God there is neither a noun [nomen], nor a verb [verbum], nor a reason, nor an opinion nor a phantasm [phantasia] »: therefore God is entirely un-nameable.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher (says) in the Book on Causes:[2] « The First Cause is superior to every narration »; but what is superior to every narration can not be told forth [est inenarrabile], and every such is un-nameable: ergo etc..

3. Likewise, it is shown *by reason* thus: a *name* [nomen] has some proportion and similitude to the one named, as the voice

significatum; sed Deus est infinitus omnino, vox autem omnis finita: ergo cum nulla sit proportio,[3] nulla per vocem erit expressio: ergo nec nominatio.

[vox] to the (thing) signified; but God is entirely infinite, but every voice finite: therefore, since there is no proportion,[3] there will be no expression [nulla expressio] through the voice: therefore neither a naming.

4. Item, omne *nomen* imponitur a forma aliqua;[4] sed in Deo non est ponere certam formam; unde Augustinus:[5] « Deus, qui omnem formam subterfugit, intellectui pervius esse non potest »: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, every *name* is imposed by some form;[4] but in God there is no positing of certain form; whence (St.) Augustine (says):[5] « God, who escapes [subterfugit] every form, cannot be pervious to the understanding »: ergo etc..

5. Item, omne *nomen* significat substantiam cum qualitate;[6] sed in Deo est substantia mere sine quantitate et qualitate: ergo non contingit Deum significare per nomen.

5. Likewise, every *noun* [nomen] signifies a substance with a quality;[6] but in God there is merely the Substance without quantity and quality: therefore does not happen that one signifies God through a noun.

6. Item, quod nec[7] per *pronomen*. Pronomen enim non habet significationem determinatam nisi per demonstrationem vel relationem.[8] Demonstratio autem fit mediantibus accidentibus, quae possunt oculis conspici; sed haec non sunt in Deo: ergo videtur, quod Dei neque sit nomen, neque pronomen.

6. Likewise, that neither[7] (does it happen that one signifes Him) through a *pronoun* [pronomen]. For a pronoun does not have a determinate signification, except through a demonstration and/or relation.[8] But a demonstration comes to be by means of accidents, which can be caught sight of [conspici] with the eyes, but these are not in God: therefore it seems, that for God there is neither a noun, nor a pronoun.

Contra: 1. In Psalmo:[9] *Dominus nomen illi*. Et iterum:[10] *Quam admirabile est nomen tuum in universa terra*. ergo Deus habet nomen.
2. Item, Dionysius fecit librum de divinis nominibus: aut ergo Deus est nominabilis, aut scientia ibi tradita cassa[11] est et inutilis.

On the contrary: 1. In the Psalm (there is sung):[9] *"The Lord" (is) His Name*. And again:[10] *How admirable is Thy Name in all the Earth*: therefore God has a Name.
2. Likewise, (St.) Dionysius wrote [fecit] a book on the Divine Names: therefore either God is nameable, or the knowledge handed down there is worthless [cassa][11] and useless.

3. Item, *ratione* videtur: quia omne quod se exprimit verbo, potest se exprimere signo verbi, sed signum verbi est vox:[12] ergo cum Deus se suo verbo exprimat, potest exprimi voce; sed quod potest voce exprimi, potest nominari: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because everything which expresses itself by word [verbo], can be expressed by the sign of a word, but the sign of a word is the voice [vox]:[12] therefore since God expresses Himself with His own Word, He can be expressed with the voice, but what can be expressed with voice, can be named: ergo etc..

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[1] Cap. 1. circa med. Cfr. supra pag. 67. nota 6. — Verba, quae immediate post ex Dionysio allegantur, reperies loc. cit., ac iuxta translationem Scoti Erigenae sic exhibentur: Et neque sensus eius est, neque phantasia, neque opinio, nequo nomen, nequem verbum, neque tactus, neque scientia.
[2] Prop. 6.
[3] Nempe inter vocem et Deum. Vat. incongrue et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 addit *finiti ad*

[1] Chapter 1, near the middle. Cf. above d. 3, p. I, a. sole, q. 1, p. 67, footnote 6. — You will find the words, which are cited immediately after this, from (St.) Dionysius, in loc. cit., and according to the translation of Scotus Erigena they are exhibited thus: And neither is there a sense of Him, nor a phantasm, nor an opinion, nor a noun, nor a verb, nor a touch, nor knowledge [Et neque sensus eius est, neque phantasia, neque opinio, nequo nomen,

infinitum. — De maiori huius argumenti vide Boethium in prima et secunda editione supra I. Periherm. c. 1, ubi inter alia dicit: Omnes vox animi sensa significat, quare ex animi intellectibus quidquid evenerit vocibus indicatur. Ergo nunc hoc dicit (Aristoteles): Similitudo est, inquit, quaedam inter se intellectum atque vocum; quemadmodum enim sunt quaedam simiplica, quae ratione animi concipiuntur et constituuntur intelligentia mentis, in quibus neque veritas ulla neque falsitas invenitur, ita quoque in vocibus est.

[4] Alanus ab Insulis, Theolog. regulae, reg. 17. ait: Cum omne nomen secundum primam institutionem datum sit a proprietate sive a forma, unde Boethius ait: Rebus ex materia formaque constantibus solus humanus animus exstitit, qui prout voluit, nomina rebus impressit etc.

[5] Cfr. Serm. 117. de verbis Evang. Ioan. 1: In principio erat Verbum etc., c. 2. n. 3: Ineffabiliter potest intelligi, non verbis hominis fit, ut intelligatur. Verbum Dei tractamus et dicimus, quare non intelligatur. Non nunc dicimus, ut intelligatur, sed dicimus quid impediat, ne intelligatur. Est enim forma quaedam, forma non formata, sed forma omnium formatorum; forma incommutabilis, sine lapsu, sine defectu, sine tempore, sine loco, superans omnia, existens omnibus et fundamentum quoddam in quo sint, et fastigium sub quo sint . . . Dicimus, quam incomprehensibile sit quod lectum est; tamen lectum est, non ut comprehenderetur ab homine, sed ut doleret homo, quia non comprehendit . . . Ergo est forma omnium rerum, forma infabricata, sine tempore, ut diximus, et sine spatiis locorum. Quidquid enim loco capitur, circumscribitur. Forma circumscribitur finibus, habet metas, unde et quousque sit. Deinde quod loco capitur et mole quadam et spatio distenditur, minus est in parte, quam in toto. Faciat Deus, ut intelligatis.

[6] Priscian., II. Grammat. c. 5. ait de nomine: *Nomen quasi notamen*, quod hoc nomine notamus uniuscuiusque substantiae qualitatem. Plura de hoc vide apud Scotum, Grammat. speculativa, c. 8. — Mox in cod. Z omittitur *quantitate et*. In fine argumenti ex mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *significare* pro *significari*.

[7] Supple: contingit Deum significare, vel etiam cum Vat. *Deus sit nominabilis*, quod tamen deest in mss. et ed. 1.

[8] Respicitur divisio pronomium, scil. in *demonstrativa* et *relativa*; quae iuxta Priscianum, XII. Grammat. c. 1, in eo differunt, quod demonstratio interrogationi reddita primam cognitionem ostendit. Quis fecit? ego. Relatio vero secundam cognitionem significat, ut is, de quo iam dixi. Cfr. Scotus, Grammat. speculativa, c. 22.

[9] 67, 5.

[10] Psalm. 8, 2.

[11] Cod. K V *superflua*.

[12] Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1: Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce, earum quae sunt in anima passionum, notae. — Mox post *Deus* Vat. contra antiquiores mss. et ed. 1 omittit *se*, deinde ponit *exprimatur* loco *exprimat*.

nequem verbum, neque tactus, neque scientia].

[2] Proposition 6.

[3] Namely between the written word and God. The Vatican edition incongruously and contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 adds *of the finite to the infinite* [finite ad infinitum]. — On the major of this argument, see (St. Severinus) Boethius in the first and second edition of his commentary on Aristotle's, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 1, where among other things he says: All voices signify the (things) sensed by the spirit, wherefore out of the (things) understood by the spirit whatever will have come forth, is indicated by voices. Therefore now (Aristotle) says this: "There is a certain similitude," he says, "between the thing understood and the voice; for according to which measure there are certain simples, which are conceived by the reckoning of the spirit and are constituted by the intelligence of the mind, in which neither any truth nor falsity is found, thus also is in voices."

[4] Alan of Lille, Rules of Theology, rule 17 says: Since everything has been given a name according to the first institution from a property or from a form, wherefore Boethius says: "From the things constituted out of matter and form the human spirit alone stood forth, which insofar as it has willed, has impressed names upon things etc.".

[5] Cf. Sermon 117, on the words of the Gospel of (St.) John, chapter 1: *In the beginning was the Word* etc., ch. 2, n. 3: He can be ineffably understood, (but) not by the words of man does it come to be, that He is understood. We treat of the Word of God and we say, why He is not understood. For He is a certain Form, a Form not formed, but a Form of all (things) formed; an incommutable Form, without fall, without defect, without time, without place, surpassing all, standing forth from all [existens omnibus] and the a certain foundation in which (all) are, and the gable under which (all) are . . . We say, "How incomprehensible is what has been read !"; yet it has been read, not so that it might be comprehended by man, but so that many might grieve, because he has not comprehended . . . Therefore He is the Form of all things, the un-fabricated Form, without time, as we have said, and without the dimensions of place [sine spatiis locorum]. For whatever is grasped by a place, is circumscribed. A form is circumscribes by its ends, has goal posts [metas], whence and how far it is. Then what is grasped by a place and by a certain mass and space is distended, is less in a part, than in the whole. May God grant that you understand it.

[6] Priscian, Grammatical Institutions, Bk. II, ch. 5, says of the noun: *A noun (is) a quasi signature* [notamen], because by this noun we note down the quality of each substance. See more on this in (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Speculative Grammar., ch. 8. — Next in codex Z there is omitted *quantity and* [quantitate et]. At the end of the argument, form the manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *that one signifies* [significare] for *that . . . is signified* [significari].

[7] Supply: *does it happen that one signify God*, and/or with the Vatican edition *God is namable* [Deus

sit nominabilis], which however is lacking in the manuscripts and edition 1.

[8] A reference to the division of pronouns, namely, into *demonstratives* and *relatives*; which according to Priscian, Grammatical Institutions, Bk. II, ch. 1, differ in this, that a demonstration rendered to an interrogation shows the first cognition: Who made it? I did. But a relation signifies the second cognition, as "He, of whom I have already spoken". Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Speculative Grammar, ch. 22.

[9] Psalm 67:5.

[10] Psalm 8:2.

[11] Codices K and V read *superfluous* [superflua].

[12] Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 1: Therefore those, which are in a voice, are the notes of those which belong to the passions in the soul. — Next after *God* [Deus] the Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, omits *Himself* [se], and puts *is expressed* [exprimatur] in place of *expresses* [exprimat].

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4. Item, quod contingit intelligere contingit significare sive enuntiare; sed contingit Deum a nobis cognosci; hoc certum est et supra probatum:[1] ergo etc.

4. Likewise, what happens to understand, happens to signify or enunciate; but it happens that God is cognized by us; this is certain and (has been) proven above:[1] ergo etc..

5. Item, quod contingit laudare contingit et nominare; sed Deum contingit laudare, immo ipse est[2] summe laudabilis: ergo et nominabilis.

5. Likewise, what happens to praise, happens to name; but it happens that one praises God, nay He Himself is[2] most highly praise-able: therefore also nameable.

CONCLUSIO.

Deus est nominabilis, sicut est intelligibilis, non quidem perfecte, sed imperfecte.

CONCLUSION

God is nameable, just as He is intelligible, not indeed perfectly, but imperfectly.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod sicut intelligere dicitur dupliciter, sic[3] effabile et nominabile. Uno enim modo *intelligere* dicitur per *perfectum* comprehensionem; alio modo per *semiplenam* cognitionem. Sic[4] *effabile* dupliciter dicitur: uno modo per *perfectam expressionem*, alio modo per *semiplenam narrationem*. Sic etiam nominabile.

I respond: It must be said, that just as "to understand" is said in a twofold manner, so[3] "effable" and "nameable". For in one manner "*to understand*" is said through a *perfect* comprehension; in another manner through a *semi-full* cognition. So[4] "*effable*" is said in a twofold manner: in one manner through a *perfect expression*, in another manner through a *semi-full narration*. So also "nameable".

Si dicatur effabile sive nominabile secundum *perfectionem* expressionis, sic dicendum, quod sicut Deus sibi soli est intelligibilis, sic *sibi soli* est effabilis et nominabilis, non[5] alio nomine, quam ipse sit, nec alio verbo, quam ipse sit; et sicut *nobis* est incomprehensibilis, ita et ineffabilis, ita etiam et innominabilis; et per hunc modum loquitur Dionysius et Philosophus.

If "effable" or "nameable" is said according to the *perfection* of expression, in this manner it must be said, that just as God is intelligible to Himself alone, so is He effable and nameable to Himself also, not[5] by a name other, than He Himself is, nor by word other, than He Himself is; and just as He is incomprehensible *to us*, so also (is He) ineffable, so also (is He) even un-nameable; and through this manner (of speech) does

(St.) Dionysius and the Philosopher speak.

Si vero dicatur effabile et nominabile secundum *qualemcumque* narrationem,[6] sic, quemadmodum Deus est nobis cognoscibilis, ita et effabilis et nominabilis: et qui melius cognoscit melius effatur et melius nominat et expressius. Unde expressius nominat fidelis quam infidelis,[7] et scriptura, quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura, quam ratio vel philosophia. Et hoc modo procedunt *rationes* et *auctoritates* ad secundam partem.

However, if "effable" and "nameable" are said according to *any kind of* narration[6] *whatsoever*, in this manner, according to the manner which God is cognizable to us, thus (is He) both effable and nameable: and the one who cognizes better, speaks forth [effatur] better and names better and more expressly. Whence the faithful (believer) names more expressly than the infidel,[7] and the writings [scriptura], which support the Faith, such as Sacred Scripture, (more) than reason and/or philosophy. And in this manner proceed the *reasons* and *authorities* for the second part.

1. 2. Ad illud ergo quod[8] obiicitur de Dionysio et Philosopho, iam patet responsio per hoc quod loquuntur de nominatione, in qua est *perfecta* expressio.

1. 2. To that, therefore, which is objected[8] concerning (St.) Dionysius and the Philosopher, the response is already clear through that which they say concerning a naming, in which there is a *perfect* expression.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod vox in nomine[9] est proportionabilis verbo interiori sive significato; dicendum, quod hoc intelligitur de nominatione, quae totam rei significationem includit; aliter non habet veritatem, nisi intelligatur esse proportio ad rem sub ratione cognoscibilis; et sic potest esse nominabilis. Quamvis enim Deus sit infinitus, tamen finite cognoscitur a nobis.

3. To that which is objected, that the voice in a name[9] is proportional to the interior word or the (thing) signified; it must be said, that this is understood of the naming, which includes the whole signification of the thing, otherwise it does not have truth, unless a proportion be understood to be according to the thing under a reckoning of the cognizable; and in this manner it can be nameable. For although God is infinite, yet He is cognized finitely by us.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod Deus non habet formam; dicendum, quod non habet formam perviam nostro intellectui, cuiusmodi est forma, cuius est[10] imago in sensu; habet tamen formam, quia ipse est forma, quae est ratio cognoscendi, quam[11] etsi nos non cognoscimus in se, ipse cognoscit se in se, et nos eum in forma creata. Unde a forma creata nos nomina imponimus, quam intelligimus et videmus.

4. To that which is objected, that God does not have a form; it must be said, that He does not have a form pervious to our intellect, of which measure [cuiusmodi] is the form, the[10] image of which is in the sense; yet He has a form, because He Himself is the Form, which is the reason for cognizing, which[11] even if we do not cognize (Him) in Himself, He Himself cognizes Himself in Himself, and we Him in created form. Whence from the created form, which we understand and see, we impose names.

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nomen significat substantiam et qualitatem; dicendum, quod substantia et qualitas non accipiuntur ibi[12] *proprie*, sed *communiter*; substantia dicitur *quod* cognoscitur, qualitas dicitur *quo* cognoscitur,[13] et hoc per modum quietis; et hoc dico propter verbum et participium et adverbium, quod est dispositio verbi. Et quoniam in creaturis, ut plurimum differt *quod* cognoscitur et *quo*,

5. To that which is objected, that a noun signifies a substance and a quality; it must be said, that there[12] a substance and a quality are not accepted *properly*, but *commonly*; a "substance" is said (to be) *what* is cognized, a "quality" is said (to be) *whereby* it is cognized,[13] and this through a manner of rest; and I say this for the sake of verb and participle and adverb, which is a disposition of a verb. And since in

ideo nomen in creaturis ut plurimum haec[14] importat per diversitatem. In Deo vero idem est cognitum et ratio cognoscendi quantum est de se: ideo significat nomen divinum illa duo per indifferentiam secundum rem; et ita salvatur ibi ratio substantiae et qualitatis, ut congruit nomini.[15]

creatures, as *what* and *whereby* (a thing) is cognized differ very much, for that reason a noun among creatures conveys this (difference)[14] very much through a diversity. However in God the Same is the One cognized and the Reason for cognizing, as much as (the cognition) concerns Him: for that reason a Divine Name signifies those two through an indifference according to the matter; and thus the reckoning of substance and quality, as befits a name, is conserved [salvatur] There.[15]

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[1] Dist. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. — Postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus paulo supra verba activa *intelligere, significare, enuntiare* pro passivis *intelligi* etc. Dein cod. Y *ut supra* loco *et supra*.
[2] Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *est*.
[3] Ed. 1 addit *et*.
[4] Pauci codd. ut P Q X *Similiter* loco *Sic*.
[5] In cod. V. particulae *non* praefigitur *et*.
[6] Restituimus lectionem antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1, ponendo *narrationem* pro *nominationem*, quae lectio et divisioni paulo supra allatae respondet. Mox post *effabilis* cod. Z et ed. 1 repetunt *ita*.
[7] Sequimur codd. T et bb, dum ceteri codd. cum edd. omittunt *quam infidelis*, et Vat. cum uno alterove tantum codice substituit insuper *fides* loco *fidelis*. Lectionem codd. T et bb praeferimus, tum quia regulis grammaticae conformior est, tum quia indirecte auctoritate fere omnium mss. et sex primarum edd. ponentium *fidelis* comprobatur. Dein in paucis mss. ut S Y omittuntur verba *quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura*.
[8] In plurimis codd. (exc. Y) et Vat. cum edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 indebite hic additur *secundo*, et paulo infra Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et sex primas edd. incongrue ponit *loquitur* pro *loquuntur*.
[9] Lectio Vat. et cod. cc *homine* pro *nomine* est contra ea quae in obiectione ipsa afferuntur et contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1.
[10] Plures codd. ut G H I M Z etc. cum ed. 1 addiciunt *aliqua*.
[11] Ex fere omnibus vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quam* pro minus congruo *quoniam*. Mox cod. V *cognocamus* loco *cognoscimus*, et paulo infra post *Unde* in cod. Y additur *et*.
[12] Vat. et cod. cc omittunt *ibi*, quod tamen in aliis mss. et ed. 1 habetur. Paulo supra cod. W *cum qualitate* loco *et qualitatem*.
[13] Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 1 ad ult. idem his verbis exprimit: « Non enim substantia et qualitas, cum dicitur: nomen significat substantiam etc., distinguunt sicut in praedicamentis, sed substantia dicitur ipsum signatum nominis, qualitas illud idem, in quantum capabile est ab intellectu ». Aliis verbis: substantia et qualitas hic non accipiuntur, in quantum sunt praedicamenta seu res aliquae, sed secundum modum significandi; in quantum scil. substantia significat illud, cui nomen imponitur, qualitas vero illud, a quo imponitur, seu respectum, sub quo imponitur. — Paulo ante fide mss. et ed. 1

[1] Distinction 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1. — As requested by very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted a little above this, the active verbs *understand, signify, enunciate* for their passive forms. Then codex Y has *as . . . above* [ut supra] in place of *and . . . above* [et supra].
[2] From very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *is* [est].
[3] Edition 1 adds *also* [et].
[4] A few codices, such as P Q and X, have *Similarly* [Similiter] in place of *So* [Sic].
[5] In codex V there is prefixed to *not* [non] the particle *and* [et].
[6] We have restored the reading of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, by putting *narration* [narrationem] for *naming* [nominationem], which reading also responds to the division mentioned a little above this. Next after codex Z and edition 1 read *thus (is He) also effable, thus (is He) also nameable* [ita et effabilis ita et nominabilis].
[7] We follow codices T and bb, while all the other codices together with the editions omits *than the infidel* [quam infidelis], and the Vatican edition with only one or the other codex substitutes in addition *the Faith* [fides] for *the faithful (believer)* [fidelis]. We prefer the reading of codex T and bb, both because it is more conformable to the rules of grammar, and because it is indirectly corroborated by the authority of nearly all the manuscripts and six first editions, which read *the faithful (believer)* [fidelis]. Then in a few manuscripts, such as S and Y, there are omitted the words *which support the Faith, such as Sacred Scripture* [quae fidei suffragatur, ut sacra Scriptura].
[8] In very many codices, except Y, and in the Vatican edition, together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, there is unduly added here *second* [secundo], and a little below this the Vatican edition, contrary to nearly all the codices and the six first editions, incongruously puts *he says* [loquitur] for *they say* [loquuntur].
[9] The reading of the Vatican edition and codex cc, *man* [homine] for *a name* [nomine], is contrary to those words which are mentioned in the objection itself, and contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1.
[10] Very many codices, such as G H I M Z etc., together with edition 1, have *some* [aliqua] for *the*.
[11] From nearly all the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *which* [quam] for the less

expunximus *prout*, quod Vat. post *communiter* addit. Mox post *verbum* in pluribus mss. et ed. 1 deest particula *et*.

14 Vat. cum pluribus mss. minus bene *hoc*.

15 Ad ultimam obiectionem, quae est de *pronomine*, non est explicite data solutio; quia sufficienter in praedictis continetur. — Paulo ante praestamus lectionem planiorem, quae est et lectio maioris numeri codd. et ed. 1, ponendo *secundum rem* pro *rei*, quod Vat. cum paucis mss. habet; alii demum omittunt vel *secundum* vel *secundum rem*.

congruous *since* [quoniam]. Next codex V has the subjunctive form of *we do cognize* [cognoscamus], and a little below this after *Whence* [Unde] in codex Y there is added *also* [et].

12 The Vatican edition and codex cc omit *there* [ibi], which however is had in the other manuscripts and edition 1. A little above this codex W has *with a quality* [cum qualitate] in place of *and a quality* [et qualitatem].

13 Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 1, in the last reply, expresses the same in these words: « For a substance and a quality, when there is said: "a noun signifies a substance etc.", do not distinguish as in the predicaments, inasmuch as (a noun) is graspable by the intellect ». In other words: a substance and a quality are not accepted here, inasmuch as they are predicaments or other things, but according to the manner of signifying; inasmuch as, that is, substance signified that, upon which the noun is imposed, but quality, that, by which it is imposed, or the respect, under which it is imposed. — A little before this, trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, we have expunged *insofar as* [prout], which the Vatican edition adds after *commonly* [communiter]. Next after *verb* [verbum], there is lacking in very many manuscripts and edition 1 the particle *and* [et].

14 The Vatican edition, together with very many manuscripts, has less well *this* [hoc] for *this (difference)* [haec].

15 To the last objection, which concerns the *pronoun*, there no solution is explicitly given; because it is sufficiently containedin the aforesaid [inasmuch as a *pronoun* stands in the place of a *noun*]. — A little before this we present the plainer reading, which is also the reading of the greater number of codices and edition 1, by putting *according to matter* [secundum rem] for *of matter* [rei], which the Vatican edition together with a few manuscripts has; the others omit either *according to* [secundum] and/or *according to matter* [rem]. [Trans. note: here the *matter* or *subject* signified by the Latin rem is that upon which the *noun* is imposed, that is the *what* and *whereby* of the being which is named by the noun, in this case the Divine Being.]

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p. 392

SCHOLION.

I. Distinctio et duae conclusiones in corp. positae per se sunt manifestae. — In solut. ad 4. conceditur, aliquam proportionem esse inter vocem et rem nominatam, sed tantum quatenus *cognoscibilis est*. Infinitus autem Deus tantum finite a nobis est cognoscibilis. Huic finitae cognitioni proportionabile potest esse etiam *nomen finitum*, « loquendo de proportione, quae est inter aliqua duo sub ratione, qua unum est signum et aliud signatum ». Ita Richard. a Med., hic q. 1 ad. 3. — Notanda est

SCHOLIUM

I. The distinction and the two conclusions posited in the body (of the question) have been thoroughly manifested. — In the solution to n. 4 there is conceded, that there is some proportion between the voice and the thing named, but only to the extend that *it is cognizable*. Moreover the infinite God is only finitely cognizable by us. Proportional to this finite cognition there can also be *finite* name, « speaking of the proportion, which is between any two under the reckoning, whereby one is a sign and

sententia in solut. ad 3, quod nos Deum cognoscimus « in forma creata; unde a forma creata nos nomina imponimus, quam intelligimus et videmus »; de quo cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. q. 2. Addit Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit.), quod a ceaturis secundum Ioan. Damascenum tribus modis nomina imponimus, scil. « *imaginibus* et *formis* et *notis*. *Notis* nominatur Deus privationibus, cum dicitur immensus Deus, infinitus, incircumscriptibilis; *imaginibus*, cum nominatur dispositionibus spiritualium creaturarum, ut cum dicitur spiritus, sapiens, intelligens; *formis*, cum nominatur similitudinibus corporalium creaturarum, ut cum dicitur leo, ignis et huiusmodi ».

the other the (thing) signed ». Thus Richard of Middleton, here in q. 1, in reply to n. 3. — The sentence in the solution to n. 3 must be noted, that we cognized God « in the created form; whence from the created form, which we understand and see, we impose names »; concerning which, cf. above d. 3, p. I, q. 2. Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., below) adds, that from creatures, according to (St.) John Damascene, we impose names in three manners, that is « *as images* and *as forms* and *as marks*. *By marks* God is named by privations, when God is said (to be) "the Immense One", "the Infinite One", "the Incircumscribable One"; *by images*, when He is named according to the dispositions of spiritual creatures, such as when He is said (to be) "a Spirit", "the Wise One", "the Intelligent One"; *by forms*, when He is named by the similitudes of corporal creatures, as when He is said (to be) "the Lion (of Judah)", "an (unquenchable) fire", and (things) of this kind ».

II. Solut. ad 6. 7. in eodem sensu magis explicatur a S. Thom. (S. I. q. 13. a. 1. ad 3.), et ab Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. ad ult.), qui verba ob brevitatem subobscura: « Et hoc dico propter verbum et participium et adverbium, quod est dipositio verbi », sic explanat: « Licet vebum et participium signifcent cum tempore, nihilominus tamen Deus quodammodo notificabilis est, non quia ipse cadit sub tempore, sed quia iuxta possibilitatem intellectus nostri, qui intelligit *cum motu et tempore*, intelligimus et significamus. Unde et hoc verbum *est*, dictum de Deo, non significat cum motu et tempore. Unde Augustinus super illud Ioan. I: In principio erat Verbum, dicit: Verbum substantivum (nempe *est*) duplicem habet significationem: aliquando enim temporales motus secundum analogiam aliorum verborum declarat; aliquando substantiam uniuscuiusque rei, de qua praedicatur, sine ullo temporali, moto designat; ideo et substantivum vocatur. Tale est quod dicitur: In principio erat Verbum » etc. — Cfr. etiam hic dub. 3.

II. The solution to nn. 6 and 7 is explained more fully in the same sense by St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 13, a. 1, in reply to n. 3), and by Alexander of Hales (loc. cit., below, in reply to the last objection), who explains those words (of St. Bonaventure) which are somewhat obscure on account of their brevity: « and I say this for the sake of verb and participle and adverb, which is a disposition of a verb », in this manner: « Though a verb and participle signify with a tense, yet, nevertheless God can be noted in a certain sense (by them), not because He Himself falls under time, but because according to the possibility of our intellect, which understands *with motion and time*, we understand and signify (in this manner). Whence also this verb "*is*" [est], said of God, does not signify with movement and time. Wherefore (St.) Augustine on that (verse) of (the Gospel of St.) John, chapter I: *In the beginning was the Word*, says: "A substantive verb (namely "*is*") has a twofold signification: for sometimes it declares temporal movements according to the analogy of other verbs; sometimes the substance of the one thing, of which it is predicated, it designates by a motion without anything of time; for that reason it is also called a substantive. Such is what is

said: *In the beginning was the Word*" » etc.. — Cf. also here below, dubium 3.

III. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 1. — Scot. de hac et seqq. hic q. 1. 2; Report. hic q. unic. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 1; S. I. q. 13. a. 1. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 2. a. 16; S. p. I. tr. 3. q. 16. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 73. q. 1. — Durand., de hac et duab. seqq. hic q. 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1. — Biel, de hac et seqq. hic q. unic.

III. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 1. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, on this and the following questions, here in qq. 1 and 2; Reportatio., here in q. sole. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 1; Summa., I, q. 13, a. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 2, a. 16; Summa., p. I, tr. 3, q. 16. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 73, q. 1. — Durandus, on this and the following questions, here in q. 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1. — (Gabriel) Biel, on this and the following questions, here in q. sole.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 392-394.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXII

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 392-394.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO II.

Utrum Deus habeat unum solum nomen, an plura.

QUESTION 2

Whether God has only, one Name, or more.

Secundo quaeritur, utrum Deus habeat unum solum nomen, an plura. Et quod plura, videtur:

1. *Auctoritate* Scripturae, quae ipsum diversis nominibus appellat. Exodi sexto:[1] *Nomen meum magnum Adonai non indicavi eis*. Exodi decimo quinto:[2] *Omnipotens nomen eius*. Et Psalmo:[3] *Dominus nomen illi*. Si ergo ista sunt diversa nomina, patet auctoritate Scripturae, quod Deus habet plura nomina.

2. Item, Dionysius in libro de Divinis Nominibus[4] plura assignat nomina Dei; Ambrosius similiter in libro de Trinitate,[5] et Magister similiter in littera.

3. Item, hoc ipsum *ratione* videtur; quia nullum nomen sufficienter exprimit esse divinum nec in se nec in comparatione ad nostrum[6] intellectum. Quod patet, quia omnis perfectio et est et intelligitur esse in Deo; et nullum nomen exprimit omnis conditionis perfectionem: ergo cum non possit fieri per unum, indigemus pluribus.

4. Item, illud in quo res conveniunt et in quo differunt, aut necesse est pluribus nominibus[7] dicere, aut necesse est unum aequivocari; sed aequivocatio generat ambiguitatem et tollenda est: ergo congruum est diversis exprimere nominibus. Cum ergo in divinis sit commune et proprium et hoc in pluribus, necesse est, plura nomina esse.

5. Item, quamvis una sit prima veritas,[8] tamen articuli fidei sunt multi: si ergo fides de Deo multos articulos credit, et *quod corde creditur ad iustitiam* oportet *ore confiteri ad salutem*,[9] multos potest et debet articulos ore confiteri; sed multi articuli uno nomine non expresse et explicite exprimuntur: ergo oportet habere plura nomina.

Contra: 1. Hilarius:[10] « Non sermoni res, sed . . .

Second there is asked, whether God has only, one Name, or (whether He has) more. And that (He has) more, seems:

1. *By the authority* of Scripture, which addresses [appellat] Him with diverse names. In the sixth (chapter) of Exodus:[1] *My great Name, "Adonai", I did not indicate to them*. In the fifteenth (chapter) of Exodus:[2] "*The Omnipotent" (is) His Name*. And in the Psalm:[3] "*The Lord" (is) His Name*. If, therefore, these are diverse names, it is clear from the authority of Scripture, that God has many Names.

2. Likewise, (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) in the book <u>On the Divine Names</u>[4] assigns many Names for God; (St.) Ambrose similarly in the book <u>On the Trinity</u>,[5] and Master (Peter) similarly in the text.

3. Likewise, this very (thing) seems *by reason*, because no name sufficiently expresses the Divine 'Being' [esse divinum], neither in itself, nor in comparison to our[6] intellect. Which is clear, because every perfection both is and is understood to be in God; and no name expresses the perfection of every condition: therefore since it cannot be done through one, we need more.

4. Likewise, that in which things convene and in which they differ, either is necessary to say with many names,[7] or it is necessary that one be equivocated; but equivocation generates ambiguity and is to be taken away: therefore it is congruous that one express (this) with diverse names. Since, therefore, among the divine there is (something) common and proper and this in many, it is necessary, that there be many Names.

5. Likewise, although one is the First[8] Truth, yet the articles of the Faith are many: if, therefore, faith believes many articles concerning God, and *what is believed in the heart for justice* is bound [oportet] *to be confessed by the mouth for salvation*,[9] one can and ought to confess many articles with the mouth; but with one Name many articles are not expressly and explicitly expressed: therefore He is bound to have many Names.

On the contrary: 1. (St.) Hilary (says):[10] « Not thing to speech, but . . .

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[1] Vers. 3.

[1] Verse 3.

2 Vers. 3.
3 67, 5.
4 Cap. 1. § 8, ubi nomina generatim recensentur, quae Deo et a sacra Scriptura v. g. Ego sum qui sum, vita, lux etc. et a sapientibus v. g. bonum, pulcrum, etc. attribuuntur.
5 Id est, II. de Fide ad Gratianum, in Prologo; vide hic lit. Magistri, c. 1. — Cod. W ponit *Augustinus* et ed. 1 *Anselmus* pro *Ambrosius*. Mox post *Magister* unus alterve codex ut S Y omittit *similiter*.
6 In Vat. et cod. cc desideratur *nostrum*, quod in ceteris mss. et ed. 1 invenitur. Paulo infra cod. X *perfectionis conditionem* pro *conditionis perfectionem*.
7 Praeferimus lectionem codd. G M et ed. 1 ponendo *nominibus* pro *modis vel nominibus*. Mox post *ambiguitatem* cod. X *quae* loco *et*, dein post *congruum est* in cod. H additur *pluribus et* ac in cod. I post *diversis* adiungitur *modis dicere et*.
8 Antiquiores codd. cum ed. 1 contra Vat. in hac propositione exhibent *prima*, quamvis aliqui eorum vel verbis transpositis legat *una prima sit veritas* vel *una* male omittant.
9 Rom. 10, 10. — Paulo infra post *expresse* cod. bb *nec* pro *et*, qui et dein cum cod. aa ponit *debet* loco *oportet*.
10 Libr. IV. de Trin. n. 14.

2 Verse 3.
3 Psalm 67:5
4 Chapter 1, § 8, where according to their genera he recounts the Names, which are attributed to God by Sacred Scripture, v. g. "*I am who am", "the Life", "the Light"*, and by wise men, v. g., "the Good", "the Beautiful" etc..
5 That is, On the Faith to Gratian, Bk. II, in the Prologue; see here the text of Master (Peter), ch. 1. — Codex W puts *(St.) Augustine* [Augustinus] and edition 1 *(St.) Anselm* [Anselmum] in place of *(St.) Ambrose* [Ambrosus]. Next after *Master (Peter)* [Magister] one or the other codex, such as S and Y, omits *similarly* [similiter].
6 In the Vatican edition and codex cc there is wanting *our* [nostrum], which is found in all the other manuscripts and edition 1. A little below this, codex X has *the condition of every perfection* [omnis perfectionis conditionem] for *the perfection of every condition* [omnis conditionis perfectionem].
7 We prefer the reading of codices G and M and edition 1, which put *names* [nominibus] for *manners and/or names* [modis vel nominibus]. Next after *ambiguity* [ambiguitatem], codex X has *which* [quae] for *and* [et], then after *it is congruous* [congruum est] in codex H there is added *many and* [pluribus et] before *diverse* [diversis], and in codex I there is read *that one say and express (this) with diverse manners and names* [diversis modis dicere et exprimere nominibus].
8 The more ancient codices, together with edition 1, contrary to the Vatican edition, in this proposition exhibit the word *First* [prima], though some of them either read with transposed words *there is one First Truth* [una prima est veritas] and/or badly omit *one* [una].
9 Rom. 10:10. — A little below this after *expressly* [expresse] codex bb has *nor* [nec] for *and* [et], which then together with codex aa puts *ought* [debet] for *is bound* [oportet].
10 On the Trinity, Bk. IV, n. 14.

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p. 393

rei sermo est subiectus »: ergo cum in Deo sit omnimoda realis unitas, ergo et vocis et nominis.

speech to thing has been subjected »: therefore since in God there is an omnimodal, real Unity, therefore also (a unity) of voice and Name.

2. Item, omne quod est in Deo, est Deus, ergo quod significat aliquid quod est in Deo, est Deus; sed Deus unus est: ergo omnia[1] divina nomina habent unum significatum; sed omnia talia sunt synonyma, nominibus autem synonymis non plus dicitur pluribus quam uno: ergo videtur, quod omnia alia ab uno sint praeter necessaria.

2. Likewise, everything which is in God, is God, therefore what signifies anything which is in God, is God; but God is One: therefore all[1] Divine Names have one Signified; but all such are synonyms; moreover with synonymous names there is not said more with many than with one: therefore it seems, that all other than one are more than necessary.

3. Item, multiplicatio divinorum nominum aut venit a parte *rei*, aut a parte *intellectum*, aut a parte *effectuum*. Si a

3. Likewise, the multiplication of Divine Names either comes on the part of the *Thing*, or on part of the (human) *intellect*, or

parte *rei*, tunc bonitas et veritas non sunt nomina diversa, quia res omnino una; si a parte *effectuum*, tunc ergo unitas et aeternitas non sunt diversa, cum non connotent effectum; si a parte *intellectum* solum: ergo videtur, quod huiusmodi nomina cassa sint et vana, cum non habeant aliquid respondens[2] in re.

on the part of (His) *effects*. If on the art of the *Thing*, then "goodness" and "truth" are not diverse Names, because the Thing (is) entirely One; if on the part of (His) *effects*, then, therefore, "unity" and "eternity" are not diverse, since they do not connote an effect; if on part of the *intellect* alone: therefore it seems, that Names of this kind are worthless [cassa] and vain, since they do not have anything corresponding [respondens][2] in the Thing.

4. Item, in Scriptura nomen Dei singulariter proponitur, sive addatur uni, ut cum dicitur: *Dominus nomen illi*,[3] sive pluribus, ut cum dicitur: *In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti*: ergo cum eadem sit ratio rei et unius rei, et nominis et unius nominis,[4] ergo Deus tantum unum habet nomen.

4. Likewise, in Scripture the Name of God is proposed in the singular [singulariter], whether it be added to one, as when there is said: *"The Lord" (is) His Name*,[3] or to many, as when there is said: *In the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit*: therefore since there is the same reckoning of Thing and of one Thing, and of Name and of one Name,[4] therefore God only has one Name.

CONCLUSIO.

Deum nominamus modo uno nomine, modo pluribus, iuxta diversos modos, quibus nomen accipitur.

CONCLUSION

We name God now with one name, now with many, according to the diverse manners, by which "name" is accepted.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod in nomine tria sunt, scilicet *vox* et *significatio* et *ratio innotescendi*. Unde et nomen multipliciter accipitur: aliquando pro *voce* significante, ut cum dicitur: Petrus est nomen Apostoli; et sic constat, quod in Deo sunt plura nomina. Aliquando nomen accipitur pro *re significata*, ut cum dicitur: bonum et honestum sunt idem nomine; et sic in divinis quodam modo est dicere nomen unum, quodam modo plura. Si enim res significata dicatur essentialtier, sic omnia unum; si personaliter, sic plures et plura nomina correspondentia. Aliquando nomen accipitur pro *ipso notamine* sive ratione innotescendi; et sic dicendum, quod[5] quodam modo nomen unum, quodam modo plura.

I respond: It must be said, that in a name there are three (things), namely *a sound* [vox] and *a signification* and *the reckoning under which one is made known* [ratio innotescendi]. Whence also is "name" accepted in a manifold manner: sometimes on behalf of a signifying *sound*, as when there is said: '"Peter" is the name of an Apostle'; and in this manner it is established, that in God there are many Names. Sometimes "name" is accepted on behalf of the *thing signified*, as when there is said: 'the good and the honest are the same in name'; and in this manner, among the divine, there is in a certain manner a saying of one name, in a certain manner of many. For if the thing signified is said essentially, in this manner all (Divine Names) are one; if personally, in this manner (there are) many (Persons) and many corresponding Names. Sometimes "name" is accepted on behalf of *the mark itself* [ipso notamine] or the reckoning under which one is made known; and in this manner it must be said, that[5] in a certain manner (God has) one Name, in a certain manner many.

Si enim accipitur ratio innotescendi ex parte *Dei*, sic innotescit per virtutem, quae una et magna est; et sic unum nomen Dei est et magnum sive maximum. Unde Jeremiae decimo:[6] *Magnus es tu, et magnum nomen tuum*, quantum ad rationem innotescendi sive virtutem, per quam innotescit, secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo:[7] *Notus in Iudaea Deus, in Israel magnum nomen eius*.

For if the reckoning under which one is made known is accepted on the part of *God*, in this manner He is made known through the Virtue, which is one and great; and thus the Name of God is "the Great One" or "the Greatest One". Whence in the tenth (chapter) of Jeremiah (there is written):[6] *Great art Thou, and "the Great One" (is) Thy Name*, as much as regards the reckoning under which one is made known or the Virtue, through which He is made known, according to which there is said in the Psalm:[7] *God is known in Judah, in Israel "the Great One" (is) His Name*.

Si autem accipiatur ratio innotescendi ratione[8] *effectuum* sive creaturarum, sic diversa sunt nomina. Nam Deus innotescit nobis tripliciter, scilicet per *causalitatem*, per *ablationem* et per *excellentiam*;[9] et secundum hoc est multitudo nominum. Si enim nominetur per *causalitatem*, multa sunt nomina, quia multos habet effectus; si per *ablationem*, multa sunt nomina, quia multa removentur, scilicet omnia creata; si per *excellentiam*, multa, quia in multis, in omnibus scilicet conditionibus nobilitatis, excedit creaturas.[10]

But if the reckoning under which one is made known is accepted by reason[8] of (His) *effects* or creatures, in this manner there are diverse Names. For God is made known to us in a threefold manner, namely through *causality*, through *ablation* and through *excellence*;[9] and according to this there is a multitude of Names. For if He be named through *causality*, there are many Names, because He has many effects; if through *ablation*, there are many Names, because many (names) are removed (from Him), that is all created ones; if through *excellence*, (there are) many, because in many, in all, that is, the conditions of nobility, He exceeds creatures.[10]

4. Ex praedictis patent obiecta. Quod enim obiicit, quod Scriptura nomen Dei exprimit singulariter; dicendum, quod Scriptura, ut plurimum nomen Dei praedicat *magnum*, *admirabile*,[11] *sanctum* et *laudabile*; et sic non loquitur de nomine, secundum quod *vox*, sed secundum quod *ratio inontescendi* a parte Dei; et sic unum. Tamen non sequitur: loquitur singulariter, ergo unum solum, quia ferquenter quod dicitur singulariter dicitur et universaliter, ut patet in multis exemplis in Lege, cum dicebatur: *homo de domo Israel*,[12] vel *homo qui fecerit* hoc vel illud, intelligebatur de quolibet homine.

4. From the aforesaid, the objections are clear. For because it objects, that Scripture expresses the Name of God in the singular; it must be said, that Scripture, as it very much preaches the Name of God (as) *the Great*, *the Admirable*,[11] *the Holy* and *the Praise Worthy*; and in this manner does not speak of "name", according to which (it is) *a sound* [vox], but according to which it is a *reckoning under which one is made known* on the part of God; and in this manner (expresses) one (Name of God). However, it does not follow: 'it speaks in the singular, therefore (God has) only one (Name)', because frequently what is said in the singular is also said universally, as is clear in the many examples in the Law, when there used to be said: *a man of the House of Israel*,[12] and/or *the man who made* this and/or that, it was understood of any man.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod *unitas*[13] est a parte rei; dicendum, quod pluralitas a parte rei est, . . .

3. To that which is objected, that the *unity*[13] is on the part of the Thing; it must be said, that there is a Plurality on the part of the Thing, . . .

[1] Ex mss. et sex primis edd. supplevimus *omnia*. Paulo supra post primum *ergo* in cod. T repetitur *omne*. In fine huius argumenti Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 habet *non sint necessaria* loco *sint praeter necessaria*.
[2] Vat. contra plurimos codd. et ed. 1 *correspondens*.
[3] Psalm. 67, 5; Matth. 28, 19. — Paulo ante ex plurimis antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *addatur* loco *additur*, et codd. G H M cum ed. 1 post *singulariter* bene addunt *semper*.
[4] Aristot., IV. Metaph. text. 3. (III. c. 2.): Idem enim et unus homo, et homo et ens homo; et non diversum aliquid ostendit secundum dictionem repetitam homo et ens, homo et unus homo.
[5] Vat. cum cod. cc, sed aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, omittit *quod*.
[6] Vers. 6, post quem textum in Vat. et cod. cc additur *id est*. Paulo ante cod. Y *et* loco *sive*, dum cod. W particulam *et* ibi verbo *magnum* praefixam omittit.
[7] 75, 2.
[8] Cod. M cum ed. 1 *a parte*.
[9] Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 7. § 3, cuius vide supra pag. 77, nota 10.
[10] Cod. aa addit: *Quartus modus potest addi, ut dicatur quod innotescit nobis Deus per similitudinem; et sic similiter sunt multa nomina, ut leo, agnus, lapis et huiusmodi*. Eadem verba inveniuntur in cod. bb ad marginem. Praedicti duo codices pro quolibet trium modorum cognoscendi Deum addunt exempla; sic pro via causalitatis post *nomina* adiiciunt *ut creator, conditor et huiusmodi*; pro via abalationis post *nomina* ponunt *ut incorporeus, immensus et husiusmodi*; pro via excellentiae post *multa* addunt *ut supersubstantialis, superbonus et huiusmodi*. Cod. X hic addit verbum *sunt*. Cod. Y in principio huius propositionis habet *nominatur* pro *nominetur*.
[11] Plures mss. ut A S T V etc. cum ed. 1 *mirabile*. Paulo infra termino *unum* in cod. W praefigitur *est*.
[12] Levit. 17, 8. — Fide mss. antiquiorum et ed. 1 restituimus *domo*.
[13] Vat. cum cod. cc *pluralitas*, sed contra scopum obiections et alios codd. cum ed. 1. Mox cod. I, verbis transpositis, *dicendum, quod si accipiatur res pro persona, pluralitas a parte rei est*.

[1] From the manuscripts and six first editions, we have supplied *all* [omnia]. A little above this after the first *therefore* [ergo], in codex T there is read *everything which* [omne quod] for *what* [quod]. At the end of this argument the Vatican edition, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has *are not necessary* [non sunt necessaria] for *are more than necessary* [sint praeter necessaria].
[2] The Vatican edition, contrary to very many codices and edition 1, has *corresponding* [correspondens].
[3] Psalm 67:5; Mt. 28:19. — A little before this, from very many more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *it be added* [addatur] in place of *is it added* [dicitur], and (a little before this) codices G H and M, together with edition 1, after *is* [singulariter] add well *always* [semper].
[4] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. IV, text 3 (Bk. III, ch. 2): For the same is one man, and a man and the one being a man [ens homo]; and it shows nothing diverse according to the repeated saying ‘a man and a being, a man and one man’.
[5] The Vatican edition together with codex cc, but breaking with the other codices and edition 1, omits *that* [quod].
[6] Verse 6, after which text in the Vatican edition and in codex cc there is added *that is* [id est] in place of *(there is written)*.
[7] Psalm 75:2.
[8] Codex M together with edition 1 has *on the part* [a parte] for *by reason* [ratione].
[9] (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite), On the Divine Names, ch. 7, § 3, which is cited above, in d. 3, dubium 1, page 77, footnote 10.
[10] Codex aa adds: *A fourth manner can be added, as (when) there is said, that God is made known to us through a similitude; and in this manner there are similarly many names, such as “Lion”, “Lamb”, “Rock” and (those) of this kind* [Quartus modus potest addi, ut dicatur quod innotescit nobis Deus per similitudinem; et sic similiter sunt multa nomina, ut leo, agnus, lapis et huiusmodi] The same words are found in codex bb along the margin. The aforesaid two codices adds examples for each of the three manners of cognizing God; thus for the way of causality after *names* they insert, *such as “Creator”, “Founder” and (those) of this kind* [ut creator, conditor et huiusmodi]; for the way of ablation after *Names* [nomina], they put *such as “Incorporeal”, “Immense”, and (those) of this kind* [ut incorporeus, immensus et husiusmodi]; for the way of excellence after *many* [multa], they add *as “Supersubstantial”, “Super-good”, and (those) of this kind* [ut supersubstantialis, superbonus et huiusmodi]. Codex X adds here (i.e. before *many* [multa]?) the verb *there are* [sunt]. Codex Y at the beginning of this proposition has *if He is named* [nominatur] for *if He be named* [nominetur].
[11] Very many manuscripts, such as A S T V etc., together with edition 1, read *Wonderful* [mirabile]. A little below this codex W reads *there is* [est] for *(expresses)*.
[12] Leviticus 17:8. — Trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have restored *the*

House [domo].
[13] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, reads *plurality* [pluralitas] for *the unity* [unitas], but contrary to the scope of the objection and the other codices, together with edition 1. Next, codex I, with transposed words, reads: *it must be said, that if the Thing is accepted on behalf of a person, the plurality is on the part of the thing* [dicendum, quod si accipiatur res pro persona, pluralitas a parte rei est].

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p. 394

ut accipiatur *res* pro *persona*. Si autem pro *natura*, etsi non sit pluralitas in se, tamen[1] in quantum innotescit. Et ideo plura nomina.

such that the *Thing* is accepted on behalf of a *Person*. But if on behalf of *the Nature*, even if there is no plurality in Itself, yet[1] (there is) inasmuch as It becomes known. And for that reason (there are) many Names.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod nomina talia sunt synonyma; dicendum, quod tunc sunt nomina[2] synonyma, cum differunt a parte vocis solum. Hic autem est differentia secundum rationem innotescendi, et ideo non sunt synonyma. Alia ratio dicta fuit supra, distinctione octava in primo problemate.[3]

2. To that which is objected, that such names are synonyms: it must be said, that names[2] are then synonyms, when they differ solely on the part of the *sound* [vocis]. But here there is a difference according to the reckoning under which one is made known, and for that reason they are not synonyms. The other reason has been given above, in the Eighth Distinction, in the first problem.[3]

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod si venit a parte *intelligendi solum*, ergo talia nomina sunt vana; dicendum, quod non venit ab hoc solum, quoniam illi rationi innotescendi respondet pluralitas in creaturis, et in Deo respondet vera unitas[4] complectens illam totam pluralitatem. Unde quia intelligimus Dei potentiam et sapientiam per diversa, diversimode nominamus; et quia in Deo est vere sapientia et potentia, ideo non est ibi vanitas.[5]

3. To that which is objected, that if (the multiplication of Divine Names) comes *solely* on the part of the *understanding*, therefore such names are vain; it must be said, that it does not come form this solely, since to that reckoning under which He is made known there corresponds [respondet] the plurality in creatures, and in God there corresponds a true Unity,[4] comprising that whole plurality. Wherefore, because we understand the Power and Wisdom of God through diverse (things), we name in a diverse manner; and because in God there is truly a Wisdom and Power, for that reason there is no vanity There.[5]

SCHOLION.

I. Distinguit S. Doctor in termino tria, scilicet vocem significantem, rem significantem, rationem innotescendi. Ad illustrandum hoc ultimum membrum vulgo exemplum hoc afferebatur in notificatione *hominis*, quod factus sit ex *humo*. Divina autem essentia, in se una, simplicissima et infinita, est ratio innotescendi respectu ad plura, cum intellectus noster illam unam summam perfectionem non unico conceptu exprimere possit, sed alium conceptum formet de

SCHOLIUM

I. The Seraphic Doctor distinguishes in the term ("name") three (things), namely a signifying sound [vocem], a signifying thing [rem], the reckoning under which a thing is made known [rationem innotesscendi]. To illustrate this last member there used to be offered this popular example regarding that which "man" [homo] noted, (namely) that he had been bade out of *humus* [ex humo]. But the Divine Essence, in Itself one, most simple and infinite, is the reckoning under

infinito illo uno sub ratione *sapientiae*, alium sub ratione *bonitatis*, et sic de aliis attributis. — Iuxta dictam distinctionem quaestio solvitur quinque propositionibus principalibus et nonnullis adiunctis. Pro explicatione servire potest supra d. 8. p. II.q. 2; et quoad solut. ad 2. 3. ibid. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. circa fin.; S. Thom., S. I. q. 13. a. 4; S. c. Gent. I. c. 35.

which He is made known in respect to many (things), since our intellect cannot express that one most high Perfection with a unique concept, but forms another concept from that Infinite One under the reckoning of *wisdom*, another under the reckoning of *goodness*, and thus of the other attributes. — According to the said distinction the question is solved with five principle propositions and with not a few (others) adjoined. For an explanation there can serve (what has been said) above in d. 8, p II, q. 2, and in regard to the solutions to nn. 2 and 3, ibid., p. I, a. 1, q. 1, near the end; St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 13, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles, I, ch. 35.

II. Notandum, quod in solutione oppositorum ordo argumentorum mutatus est. Opposit. 1. non solvitur explicite, cum principia solutionis iam exhibita sint in corp. Prima solutio respicit 4. opposit.; secunda vero respicit 3. oppost. quoad primum membrum. Deinde sequitur solut. ad 2; et ultimo loco ad tertium membrum 3. oppositi.

II. It must be noted, that the order in the solution of the opposed arguments has been changed. The 1st opposed (argument) is not explicitly solved, since the principles of the solution have already been exhibited in the body (of the response). The first solution respects the 4th opposed (argument); but the second respects the 3rd opposed (argument), in regard to its first member. Then there follows the solution to the 2nd; and in the last place (the solution) to the third member of 3rd opposed (argument).

III. In conclusione omnes conveniunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 1. et m. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 3. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 8. a. 3; S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 59. m. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. unic. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 2. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 73. q. 9. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

III. In the conclusion all agree: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 1, and m. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 3. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), d. 8, a. 3; Summa., p. I, tr. 14, q. 59, m. 4. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. sole, a. 2. — Richard of Middleton, here in a. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 2. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 73, q. 9. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 3.

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[1] Supple: *est*, quod codd. Z aa bb particulae *tamen* praefigunt.
[2] Ex plurimis mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *nomina*, et mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *differunt* pro inepto *dicuntur*, ac paulo infra supplevimus *sunt*.
[3] Nempe p. I. q. 1. ad ult.
[4] Cod. T *una veritas*, cum quo concordat cod. S, qui omisso *una*, ponit *veritas*; cod. Y, omissa *vera*, habet *unitas*, et codd. aa bb post *unitas* addunt *sive veritas*.
[5] Ed. 1 adiungit *sed veritas et unitas*, quae et paulo ante adverbio *vere* praemittit *unum*.

[1] Supply: *is*, which codices Z aa and bb prefix to the word *yet* [tamen].
[2] From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we insert *names* [nomina], and next trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *differ* [differunt] for the inept *are said* [dicuntur], and a little below this, we have supplied *they are* [sunt].
[3] Namely, in p. I, q. 1, in reply to the last objection.
[4] Codex T reads *one Truth* [una veritas], with which codex S agrees, which having omitted *one* [una], reads *the Truth* [veritas]; codex Y, having omitted *true* [vera], has *a Unity* [unitas], and codices aa and bb after *Unity* [unitas], add *or Truth* [sive veritas].
[5] Edition 1 adds *but (rather) truth and unity* [sed veritas et unitas], which also a little before this reads *in God One (Being) is truly Wisdom and Power* [in

Deo est unum vere sapientia et potentia].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio III.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 394-397.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXII

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 3

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 394-397.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO III.

Utrum omnia divina nomina dicantur translative.

Tertio quaeritur, utrum omnia nomina divina dicantur translative, an etiam quaedam dicantur proprie. Et quod omnia dicantur translative, videtur.

1. In *Regulis fidei*[6] dicitur: « Omne simplex proprie est, et improprie dicitur »; sed quod improprie dicitur, improprie nominatur: cum ergo Deus sit simplex, nominatur improprie; sed improprietas reducitur ad proprietatem: ergo nomina divina de Deo dicuntur improprie, de aliis proprie; sed quod dicitur de aliquod improprie, dicitur translative, si de alio proprie:[7] ergo etc.

QUESTION 3

Whether all Divine Names are said in a transferred manner.

Third there is asked, whether all Divine Names are said in a transferred manner [translative], or whether certain ones are also said properly. And it seems, that all are said in a transferred manner.

1. In The Rules of the Faith[6] there is said: « Every simple is properly, and is said improperly »; but what is improperly said, is improperly named: since, therefore, God is simple, He is improperly named; but impropriety is lead back [reducitur] to a property: therefore the Divine Names are said of God improperly, (and) of others properly; but what is said of anything

improperly, is said in a transferred manner, if (it is said)[7] of another properly: ergo etc..

2. Item, unumquodque, sicut contingit intelligere, contingit et significare; sed non contingit Deum intelligere[8] nisi per proprietates et conditiones creaturarum, ergo nec nominare; sed quod nominatur secundum alienas proprietas semper translative nominatur: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, just as one happens to understand[8] any one thing [unumquodque], one happens also to signify (it); but one does not happen to understand God except through the properties and conditions of creatures, therefore neither to name (Him); but what is named according to the properties of others is always named in a transferred manner: ergo etc..

3. Item, non est nisi duplex theologia, scilicet mystica et symbolica, secundum quod vult Dionysius;[9] sed utraque Deum nominat translative — nam mystica per creaturas spirituales et invisibiles, sed symbolica per corporales — ergo omnis nominatio Dei translativa est.

3. Likewise, there is naught but a twofold theology, that is, the mystical and the symbolic, according to which (St.) Dionysius (the Areopagite) would have it;[9] but each names God in a transferred manner — for the mystical (names Him) through spiritual and invisible creatures, but the symbolic through corporal ones — therefore every naming of God is a transferred one [translativa est].

4. Item, omne nomen divinum est impositum propter nostram instructionem;[10] sed omnis nostra . . .

4. Likewise, every Divine Name has been imposed for the sake of our instruction;[10] but all our . . .

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[6] Alanus ab Insulis, Theologicae Regulae, reg. 20. — Codd. aa bb post *fidei* addunt *vel theologiae*.
[7] In cod. aa additur *dicatur*; codd. vero P Q ultima verba legunt *sed de aliquo proprie* et transponunt post *improprie*.
[8] Vat. cum cod. cc, sed aliis codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *intelligi*. Paulo ante pauci codd. ut P Q V verbis *contingit et* apte praefigunt *sic*; cod. T autem loco *contingit et significare* ponit *ita et nominare*, lectio, si formam argumenti spectes, praeferenda.
[9] Epist. 9. Cfr. etiam de Div. Dom. c. 1 veruss finem et de Mystica Theolog. c. 1. — Paulo infra post *spirituales* ed. 1 omittit *et* ac dein in aliquibus codd. ut V W X particula *sed* deest; in fine argumenti plurimi mss. cum edd. 2, 3, 6 exhibent minus congrue *translative* pro *translativa*; tandem cod. O ibidem ponit *dicitur* et codd. P Q *dicitur esse* loco *est*.
[10] Respicitur illud Rom. 15, 4: Quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostram doctrinam scripta sunt.

[6] Alan of Lille, Theological Rules, rule 20. — Codices aa and bb after *of the Faith* [fidei] add *and/or Theology* [vel theologiae].
[7] In codex aa there is added *it is said* [dicatur]; but codices P and Q read instead *but of anything properly* [sed de aliquot proprie] and transposes these after *improperly* [improprie].
[8] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, but with the other codices and edition 1 striving against this, reads *as any one thing happens to be undersood* [unumquodque, sicut contingit intelligi]. A little before this a few codices, such as P Q and V, prefix *so* [sic] aptly before *one happens also to signify* [contingit et significare]; codex T, however, in place of these same words puts *thus (one happens) also to name* [ita et nominare], a reading which, if one looks at the form of the argument, is to be preferred.
[9] Epistle 9. Cf. also On the Divine Names, ch. 1, near the end, and On Mystical Theology, ch. 1. — A little below this after *spiritual* [spirituales] edition 1 omits *and* [et] and then in some codices, such as V W and X, the particle *but* [sed] is lacking; at the end of the argument very many manuscripts, together with editions 2, 3 and 6, exhibit less congruously *in a transferred manner* [translative] for *a transferred one* [translativa]; next codex O puts *is said (to be)* [dicitur] and codices P and Q *is said to be* [dicitur esse] in place of the final *is* [est].
[10] A reference to Rom. 15:4: Whatsoever has been written, has been written for our instruction [Quaecumque scripta sunt, ad nostrum doctrinam scripta sunt].

doctrina incipit a sensu:[1] ergo omen nomen Dei accipitur secundum aliquod sensibile; sed in Deo nulla est proprietas sensibilis secundum veritatem, sed solum translative: ergo etc.

learning [doctrina] begins from sense;[1] therefore every Name of God is accepted according to some sensible; but in God there is no sensible property according to truth, but solely in a transferred manner: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Apostolus dicit ad Ephesios tertio,[2] loquens de Deo: *A quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur*; sed si paternitas in terris nominatur a paternitate Dei: ergo Deus proprius et principalius dicitur Pater quam alia, non ergo translative. Hoc ipsum dicunt Dionysius[3] et Damascenus, innitentes huic auctoritati Apostoli. Inquit enim Damascenus:[4] « Sciendum, quod non est a nobis translatum ad beatum Deitatem paternitatis et filiationis et processionis nomen, sicut ait divinus Apostolus: *Ex quo omnis paternitas* »: ergo etc.

On the contrary: 1. The Apostle says in the third (chapter of his Letter) to the Ephesians,[2] speaking of God: *From whom every paternity in Heaven and Earth is named*; but if paternity on earth [in terris] is named from the paternity of God: therefore God is more properly and more principally said (to be) "Father" than others, therefore not in a transferred manner. This very (thing) does (St.) Dionysius[3] and (St. John) Damascene say, supporting (themselves) upon this authority of the Apostle. For (St. John) Damascene says:[4] « It must be known, that there is not transferred from us to the Blessed Deity the name for 'paternity' and 'filiation' and 'procession', just as the divine Apostle says: *From whom every paternity* »: ergo etc..

2. Item, beatus Ambrosius dicit, et habetur in littera,[5] quod triplex est nominum divinorum differentia, et una ex illis sunt nomina translativa: non ergo omnia dicuntur translative.

2. Likewise, Blessed Ambrose says, as it is had in the text,[5] that there is a threefold difference of Divine Names, and one of those are transferred [translativa] names: therefore not all are said in a transferred manner.

3. Item, quaedam dicuntur de Deo, quae habent oppositum in omni creatura, ut aeternitas et immensitas; sed nomen translativum attenditur secundum aliquam similitudinem:[6] ergo talia nomina non sunt translativa.

3. Likewise, certain (names) are said of God, which have an opposite in every creature, such as "eternity" and "immensity"; but a transferred name is attained according to some similitude:[6] therefore such names are not transferred ones.

4. Item, quaedam dicuntur de Deo, quorum significatum est proprie in solo Deo, ut hoc homen *bonum* et *qui est*, Lucae decimo octavo:[7] *Nemo bonus nisi solus Deus*. Et Augustinus[8] dicit, quod « solus Deus vere est, cuius comparatione cetera non sunt ».

4. Likewise, certain (names) are said of God, the signified of which is properly in God alone, as this name "*the Good*" and "*He who is*", according to the eighteenth (chapter of the Gospel of St.) Luke:[7] *No one (is) good, except God alone*. And (St.) Augustine[8] says, that « God alone truly is, in comparison to Whom all others are not ».

CONCLUSIO.

Non omnia nomina de Deo dicuntur translative: quando enim significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et oppositum in creatura, nullo modo transferuntur; quando significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et

CONCLUSION

Not all names are said of God in a transferred manner: for when they signify a thing, the truth of which is in God and the opposite in a creature, they are in no manner transferred; when they signify a

similitudo in creatura, transferuntur secundum impositionem, non secundum rem; quando denique significant rem, cuius veritas est in creatura et consimilis proprietas in Deo, proprie transferuntur.

RESPONDEO: Ad hoc voluerunt quidam dicere, quod quaedam sunt nomina, quae Deus sibi imposuit, quaedam, quae nos ei imposuimus. Si loquamur de nominibus, quae Deus sibi imposuit, cum ipse se proprie intelligat, huiusmodi nomina sunt propria; et talia dicuntur esse *bonum* et *qui est*. Unde Dionysius[9] videtur velle, quod illud nomen *bonum* solum sit proprium et principale; Damascenus[10] vero, quod illud nomen *qui est* solum est proprium et principale; et unus attendit in nomine perfectionem, alter absolutionem, uterque tamen proprietatem.[11] Si autem loquamur de nominibus, quae nos ei imposuimus, sic cum non cognoscamus Deum nisi per creaturas, non eum nominamus nisi per nomina creaturarum; et[12] ideo solum translative, sive quia proprius et prius conveniunt creaturae, sive quia prius imposita sunt creaturae, quamvis non proprius conveniant creaturae. Et haec est . . .

thing, the truth of which is in God and the similitude in a creature, they are transferred according to imposition, not according to thing; finally when they signify a thing, the truth of which is in a creature and a completely similar property in God, they are properly transferred.

I RESPOND: To this certain (authors) wanted to say, that there are certain names, which God imposed upon Himself, certain ones, which we imposed upon Him. If we speak of the names, which God imposed upon Himself, since He Himself understands Himself properly, names of this kind are proper; and such are said to be "*the Good*" and "*He who is*". Whence (St.) Dionysius[9] seems to want, that that name "*the Good*" is alone the proper and principal (name); however (St. John) Damascene,[10] that that name "*He who is*" is alone the proper and principal one; and one stretches out in name to the perfection (of God), the other to (His) absolution (from all things), each, however, to (Divine) property.[11] But if we speak of the names, which we have imposed upon Him, thus since we do not cognize God except through creatures, we do not name Him except through the names of creatures; and[12] for that reason (such names are said of God) solely in a transferred manner, whether because they more properly and first convene with a creature, or because the have been first imposed upon a creature, though they do not more properly convene with a creature. And this is . . .

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[1] Cfr. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 14. (c. 18.), III. de Anima text. 39. (c. 8.), et c. 6 de Sensu et Sensibili, nec non I. Metaph. c. 1. — Mox plures codd. ut A S T W Z etc. *aliquid* pro *aliquod*.

[2] Vers. 15, in quo textu Vat. cum Vulgata *Ex quo* pro *A quo*, et dein Vulgata *caelis* pro *caelo* contra codd. et ed. 1 exhibet. — Paulo infra cod. V *alius* pro *alia*.

[3] De Div. Nom. c. 1. § 4: Unde in omni fere theologica actione thearchiam videmus divinitus laudatam, ut monadem quidem et unum propter simplicitatem et unitatem . . . ut trinitatem vero propter subsistentem ter superessentialis fecunditatis expressionem, ex qua omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra est et nominatur.

[4] Libr. I.de Fide orthod. c. 8: Quin illud quoque nosse interest, paternitatis, filiationis et processionis vocabula non a nobis ad beatam Deitatem esse translata, verum contra illinc nobis communicata, quaemadmodum Apostolus ait: *Propterea flecto genua mea ad Patrem, ex quo omnis paternitas*.

[1] Cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 14 (ch. 18), On the Soul, Bk. III, text 39 (ch. 8), and ch. 6, "On Sense and the Sensible", and also Metaphysics, Bk. I, ch. 1. — Next very many codices, such as A S T W Z etc., have *something* [aliquid] for *some* [aliquod].

[2] Verse 15, in which text the Vatican edition, together with the Vulgate, reads *From whom* [Ex quo] for *From whom* [A quo], and then the Vulgate exhibits *in the Heavens* [in caelis] for *in Heaven* [in caelo], contrary to the codices and edition 1 [Trans. note: According to the classical conception, which distinguished Heaven from the sky, the former was caeli and the latter caelum; which distinction of terms frequently is absent in post classical Latin.]. — A little below this codex V has *another (father is)* [alius] for *others* [alia: in the sense of *other beings are*].

[3] On the Divine Names, ch. 1 § 4: Whence in nearly every theological action we see the Thearchy

[5] Hic, c. 1. — Mox cod. V. *illarum* pro *ex illis*.
[6] Cfr. supra pag. 1, nota 8..
[7] Vers. 19. Quia ista verba sic leguntur apud Lucam, ipsum in textu citavimus, licet in mss. et edd. habeatur *Matthaei*, 19, 14, ubi sic legitur: *Unus est bonus, Deus*.
[8] Libr. VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 11: « Ego sum qui sum; et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos; tanquam in eius comparatione qui vere est, quia incommutabilis est, ea quae mutabilia facta sunt, non sint ». Ceterum cfr. de hoc supra d. VIII. c. 1 lit. Magistri, ubi idem recurrit et Hieronymo attribuitur.
[9] De Div. Nom. c. 3. § 1: Ac primum, si videtur, perfectum et quod omnes Dei emanationes manifestat, boni nomen expendamus (versio Corderii). Cfr. et c. 4.
[10] Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 9, ubi et rationem addit: Nam totum esse velut immensum quoddam ac nullis terminis definitum essentiae pelagus complexu suo ipse continet. — Ex fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus particulam *vero*.
[11] Aliis verbis, Dionysius in nomine *bonum* attendit divinum esse, quatenus in se completissime existens est causa omnia comprehendens sive omnium principium et finis. Nam bonum ex natura sua est diffusivum sui tenetque rationem finis; perfectum autem est illud quod omnia praehabens potest facere sibi simile (cfr. loc. cit. c. 4. et 13.). Damascenus vero in nomine *Qui est* considerat divinum esse secundum se et absolute, quatenus est infinitum pelagus essentialitatis. Uterque tamen in his nominibus tale designat, quod Deo vere et proprie convenit. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 49. m. 4. a. 2.
[12] In Vat. et cod. cc deest *et* ab aliis codd. et ed. 1 exhibitum. Paulo supra post *cum* et dein post *creaturas* fide mss. et ed. 1 expunximus *nos*. Mox cod. T *non quia* pro *quamvis non*. Unus alterque codex ut Y in hac et in sequenti propositione *per prius* loco *proprius*.

divinely praised, such that the Monad is indeed also named "the One" on account of (His) simplicity and unity . . . so that, however, the Trinity on account of the subsistent expression of the thrice super-essential fecundity, out of which every paternity in Heaven and on Earth is, is also named.
[4] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 8: It is also interesting to know that, the vocabulary [vocabula] of paternity, filiation and procession has not been transferred by us to the Blessed Deity, but on the contrary has been communicated to us from There, according to the extent that the Apostle says: *On this account I bend my knees to the Father, from whom every paternity* etc..
[5] Here in ch. 1. — Next codex V has *of those* [illarum] for *of those* [ex illis].
[6] Cf. above Prooemium, p. 1, footnote 8.
[7] Verse 19. Because those words are thus read in St. Luke, in the very passage cited by us, though in the manuscripts and editions there is had *Matthew 19:14*, where there is read: *One is good, God* [Unus est bonus Deus].
[8] On the City of God, Bk. VIII, ch. 11: « *I am who am; and you shall say to the children of Israel: He who is has sent me to you*; as if in the comparison to Him who truly is, because He is incommutable, those which have been made mutable, are not ». For the rest of this, cf. above Master (Peter's) text, Distinction VIII, ch. 1, where the same passage recurs, and he attributes it to (St.) Jerome.
[9] On the Divine Names, ch. 3, § 1: And, if He is seen, we weigh the name "the Good" as the first, perfect (name) and as that which manifests all the emanations of God. (in Corderius' version). Cf. also ch. 4.
[10] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 9, where he also adds a reason: For He Himself contains within His own embrace 'being' in its entirety [totum esse] as a certain immense open sea of essence and defined with no limits. — From nearly all the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied the particle *however* [vero].
[11] In other words, (St.) Dionysius in the name "*the Good*" [bonum] intends the Divine 'Being' [divinum esse], to the extend that as existing most completely in Itself It is the cause comprehending all or the principle and end of all. For good out of its own nature is diffusive of itself and has the reckoning of an end; but the perfect is that which, being had before all, can make a similar to itself (cf. loc. cit. chs. 4 and 13). But (St. John) Damascene in the name "*He who is*" considers the Divine 'Being' according to Itself and absolutely, to the extent that it is an infinite, open sea of essentiality. Yet each designates such in these names, that it convenes truly and properly to God. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa, p. I, q. 49, m. 4, a. 2.
[12] In the Vatican edition and codex cc, there is lacking *and* [et], which is exhibited by the other codices and edition 1. In the previous two clauses we have expunged the explicit subjects of the verb *we* [nos], which followed the words *since* [cum] and *creatures* [creaturas], on the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1. Next codex T has *not*

because they [non quia] for *though they do not* [quamvis non]. One or the other codex, such as Y, in this and the following proposition, has *through (a consideration of what is) prior* [per prius] for *more properly* [proprius].

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p. 396

translatio quaedam, quamvis, proprie loquendo, sit translatio, quando proprius conveniunt iis, a quibus transferuntur, ut ridere hominibus proprius quam pratis.

a certain transferal [translatio quaedam], though, properly speaking, there is a transferal, when (the names) properly convene with those, from which they are transferred, such as “to laugh” (convenes) more properly with men, than with meadows.

Sed haec positio non videtur stare.[1] Cum enim[2] nos cognoscamus Deum tripliciter, scilicet per *effectum*, per *excellentiam* et per *ablationem*, constat quod omnibus his modis contingit Deum nominare. Si per *effectum*, nulla est ibi translatio;[3] similiter, si per *ablationem*, quoniam translatio attenditur secundum aliquam similitudinem: « omnes enim transferentes secundum aliquam similitudinem transferunt ».[4]

But this position does not seem to stand.[1] For since[2] we cognize God in a threefold manner, that is through an *effect*, through *excellence* and through *ablation*, it is established, that in all these manners one happens to name God. If through an *effect*, there is no transferal;[3] similarly, if through *ablation*, since a transferal is attained according to some similitude: « for all transferring according to some similitude transfer ».[4]

Et propterea aliter dicendum, quod *quaedam* sunt nomina, quae significant rem, cuius veitas est in Deo et oppositum in creatura, ut immensus et aeternus; et talia nullo modo transferuntur, nec secundum rem nec secundum impositionem. *Quaedam*[5] significant rem, cuius veritas est in Deo et similitudo eius in creatura, ut potentia, sapientia et voluntas; et talia nomina transferuntur a creaturis ad Deum, non secundum rem, sed secundum impositionem; quia prius imposita sunt creaturis quam Deo, licet prius sint in Deo. *Quaedam* sunt nomina, quae significant rem, cuius veritas[6] est in creatura et consimilis proprietas in Deo, ut lapis et leo — res enim signifcata est in creatura, sed similitudo proprietatis, ut stabilitas et fortitudo in Deo est — et ista sunt proprie translativa. Concedendum ergo, quod in divinis sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia.

And on this account it must be otherwise said, that there are *certain* names, which signify a thing, the truth of which is in God and the opposite in a creature, such as “the Immense One” and “the Eternal One”; and such are in no manner transferred, neither according to thing nor according to imposition. *Certain ones*[5] signify a thing, the truth of which is in God and its similitude in a creature, such as “Power”, “Wisdom”, and “Will”; and such names are transferred from creatures to God, not according to thing, but according to imposition; because they have been imposed upon creatures before (they have) upon God, thought they are first in God. There are *certain* names, which signify a thing, the truth[6] of which is in a creature and a completely similar property in God, such as “Rock” and “Lion” — for the thing signified is in a creature, but the similitude of the property, such as “stability” and “fortitude” is in God — and these are properly transferred [translativa]. It must be conceded, therefore, that among the divine some are transferred names, not all.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur, quod simplex improprie dicitur; dicendum, quod *dicere* ibi

1. To that, therefore, which is objected, that a simple is said improperly, it must be said,

non est *nominare*, sed[7] *enuntiare*, quia simplici non est compositio in essendo, sed est compositio in enuntiando, et ideo improprie; non sic in nominando. — Vel dic, quod non omne dictum improprie est dictum translative.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod solum per creaturas intelligitur; dicendum, quod quamvis intelligatur solum per creaturas, non tamen solum per similitudinem,[8] immo per negationem et dissimilitudinem est cognoscibilis.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod symbolica et mystica theologia nominant Deum translative; dicendum, quod quamvis mystica nominet[9] Deum translative quantum ad proprietates excellentiae, tamen non solum sic nominat, sec etiam per abnegationem; et ideo non solum translative.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod omnis nostra doctrina incipit a sensu; dicendum, quod verum est; et[10] omne nomen aliquid habet sensibile, scilicet vocem, ut audiatur; sed non oportet, quod habeat sensibilem significationem, quia verbum intelligentiae, quod est insensibile, induit vocem sensibilem.

SCHOLION.

I. Non *proprium* hic non accipitur, quatenus in divinis distinguitur contra *commune*, sed quatenus distinguitur contra *metaphoricum* seu translativum. — S. Doctor cum Angelico reiicit sententiam in prima opinione notatam, quod omnia nomina, Deo a *nobis* imposita, non sint nisi metaphorica; hoc probat per inductionem, enumerando tres vias seu modos, quibus formamus nomina divina, scil. causalitatis, negationis, eminentiae. In via eminentiae translatio fit quidem secundum quandam similitudinem, quae tamen differt a similitudine metaphorica. — Quoad modum concipiendi perfectiones divinas Richard. a Med. (loco infra cit.) haec observat: « Quaedam sunt nomina, quae significant, vel potius per quae significare intendimus distincte et insinuare (quamvis ad sic significandum non

that there "*to say*" is not "*to name*", but (rather)[7] "*to enunciate*", because for the simple there is no composition in being [in essendo], but there is a composition in enunciating, and for that reason (it is said) improperly; not so in naming. — And/or say, that not everything said improperly has been said in a transferred manner.

2. To that which is objected, that He is understood solely through creatures; it must be said, that although He is understood solely through creatures, yet not solely through a similitude,[8] nay (rather) He is (also) cognizable through negation and dissimilitude

3. To that which is objected, that symbolic and mystical theology name God in a transferred manner; it must be said, that although mystical (theology) does name[9] God in a transferred manner, as much as regards the properties of (His) excellence, yet it does not solely name (Him) in this manner, but also through abnegation; and for that reason not solely in a transferred sense.

4. To that which is objected, that all our learning begins from sense; it must be said, that it is true; and[10] every name has something sensible, namely, a spoken sound [vocem], so that it is heard; but it is not bound [oportet], that it have a sensible signification, because a word of understanding, which is insensible, puts on the sensible, spoken sound.

SCHOLIUM

I. Here "*proper*" is not accepted, to the extent that among the divine it is distinguished against "*common*", but to the extent that it is distinguished against "*metaphorical*" or "transferred". — The Seraphic Doctor together with the Angelic (Doctor) rejects the sentence noted in the first opinion, that all names, imposed upon God *by us*, are naught but metaphorical; this he proves through induction, by enumerating the three ways or manners, by which we form Divine Names, that is, (by way) of causality, negation and eminence. In the way of eminence a transferal indeed comes to be according to a certain similitude, which, however, differs from a metaphorical similitude. — In regard to the manner of conceiving the divine perfections, Richard of Middleton (loc. cit. below) makes

attingamus) res, quae per prius sunt in Deo et per posterius in creatura; et talia nomina magis proprie dicuntur de Deo quam de creatura, non ratione huius, quod per nomen *intelligimus* distincte insinuari, sed ratione huius, quod per nomen insinuare *intendimus*; et sic de Deo non dicuntur translative ». Deinde idem in solut ad 4. dicit: « Quamvis Deum intelligamus per suos effectus, quae sunt quaedam similitudines Dei, tamen cognitio nostra non sistit in illis effectibus, sed ascendit ad cognoscendum Dei virtutem et divinitatem, quamvis in generali et obscure ». — Dionysius autem Carth. (hic q. 2.) non omnino consentit solutioni S. Thomae, Bonav., Alberti aliorumque, praesertim quoad hoc, quod omnia nomina Deo imposita sint ex creaturis et quantum ad vocem translata a creaturis ad creatorem; in specie facit quasdam exceptiones contra reprobationem primae opinionis, quam habet S. Boanv. in responsione, asseritque, frequenter esse *translationem*, dum nominamus Deum tum per *effectum*, tum per *ablationem*, tum per *eminentiam*. Sed responderi potest, S. Bonaventuram minime negare, quaedam nomina non nisi Deo revelante ipsi imposita esse, sed . . .

these observations: « There are certain names, which signify, and/or rather through which we intend to signify and hint at distinctly (although we do not attain to signify it in this manner) a thing, which are in God through (a consideration of what is) prior and in a creature through (a consideration of what is) posterior; and such names more properly are said of God than of a creature, not by a reckoning of this, that through the name *we understand* that He has been distinctly hinted at, but by the reckoning of this, that through the name *we intend* to hint at it; and in this manner they are not said of God in a transferred manner ». — However, (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, (here in q. 2), does not entirely consent to the solution of Sts. Thomas, Bonaventure, Albertus (Magnus) and others, chiefly in regard to this, that all names have been imposed upon God from creatures and as much as regards the spoken sound [vocem] (have been) transferred from creatures to the Creator; in particular he makes certain exceptions against the reproof of the first opinion, which St. Bonaventure has in the Response, and he asserts, that frequently there is a *transferal*, while we name God, both through (His) *effect*, as well as through *ablation*, and through *eminence*. But one can respond, that St. Bonaventure least of all denies, that certain names have not been imposed upon Him, except by God the Revealer, but . . .

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1 Pauci mss. ut I X cum ed. 1 verbo *stare* bene praemittunt *posse*.
2 In cod. O additur *secundum Dionysium*, cuius verba vide supra pag. 77, nota 10.
3 Vat. addit *Pariformiter si per excellentiam*, quae tamen verba omittuntur in mss. et ed. 1; rationem huius omissionis vide paulo infra in solutione ad 3.
4 Aristot., VI. Topic. c. 2, de quo vide supra pag. 1, nota 8.
5 Ed. 1 adiungit *sunt nomina, quae*.
6 Codd. K V *proprietas*; paulo infra post *fortitudo* in cod. A additur *proprie*, et dein multi codd. ut A C F G H K L S etc. ponunt *ita* pro *ista*, inter quos est cod. T, qui, pluribus omissis, breviter legit *et ita sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia*.
7 Cod. T *nisi* pro *sed*. — Notandum, quod *nominare* respicit *terminum*, *ennuntiare* autem *propositionem*, quae semper est aliquid complexum sive compositum.
8 In cod. O adiicitur *creaturae*.
9 Cod. V, post *mystica* addito *et symbolica*, consequenter habet *nominent* et paulo infra *nominant*. Mox in aliquibus mss. ut A T etc. et ed. 1

1 A few manuscripts, such as I and X, together with edition 1 prefix to the word *to stand* [stare] the word *able* [posse].
2 In codex O there is added *according to (St.) Dionysius* [secundum Dionysium], for the words of which, see above d. 3, dubium 1, page 77, footnote 10.
3 The Vatican edition adds *Equi-formally, if through excellence* [Pariformiter si per excellentiam], which words, however, are omitted in the manuscripts and edition 1; see the reason for this omission a little below this, in the solution to n. 3.
4 Aristotle, Topics, Bk. VI, ch. 2, concerning which see above, Prooemium, page 1, footnote 8.
5 Edition 1 reads instead *There are certain names, which* [Quaedam sunt nomina, quae] for *Certain ones* [Quaedam].
6 Codices K and V read *the property* [proprietas]; a little below this after *"fortitude" is* [fortitudo] in codex A there is added *properly* [proprie], and then many codices, such as A C F G H K L S etc., put *thus* [ita] for *these* [ista], among which is codex T, which, having omitted many words, briefly reads *and thus*

deest *Deum*. Dein cod. X *negationem* pro *abnegationem*.

[10] Vat. cum cod. cc, mutata interpunctione, *quod* loco *et* ac mox *secundum* pro *scilicet*, sed minus distincte et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1. Paulo infra cod. W *intelligibile* pro *intelligentiae*.

some are transferred names, not all [et ita sunt aliqua nomina translativa, non omnia].

[7] Codex T has *except* [nisi] to *but (rather)* [sed]. — It must be noted, that "*to name*" respects a *term*, but "*to enunciate*" a *proposition*, which is always something complex or composed.

[8] In codex O there is added *of a creature* [creaturae].

[9] Codex V, after *mystical* [mystica], having added *and symbolic* [et symbolica], consequently has the verbs of *naming* which follow in the plural. Next in some manuscripts, such as A T etc., and edition 1 there is lacking *God* [Deum]. Then codex X reads *negation* [negationem] for *abnegation* [abnegationem].

[10] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, having changed the punctuation, reads *that* [quod] for *and* [et] and next reads *according to* [secundum] for *namely* [scilicet], but less distinctly and contrary to the other codices, together with edition 1. A little below this codex W has *an intelligible word* [verbum intelligibile] for *a word of understanding* [verbum intelligentiae].

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ipse negat, hac ratione apte distingui posse nomina *propria* a *metaphoricis*. Item, non negat S. Bonav., immo expresse affirmat, quosdam *effectus* Dei et nomina hos effectus significantia non nisi *metaphorice* de Deo dici posse. Denique secundum mentem eiusdem Seraphici dici potest, etiam nomina, quae *proprie* Deo conveniunt quoad *rem significatam* (ut sapientia), tamen quoad *modum significandi* non proprie Deo attribui, quatenus non eo modo, quo nos ea in hac vita concipimus, sed per modum in infinitum eminentiorem et perfectiorem Deo conveniunt. Sed hoc non efficit, ut ista nomina sint translativa (metaphorica) nisi in sensu improprio. Nam, ut bene dicit Richard. (loc. cit. ad 4.), « nomen *translatum* non dicitur, nisi ubi est translatio ratione *rei significatae* ».

he denies, that for this reason there can be aptly distinguished *proper* names from *metaphorical ones*. Likewise, St. Bonaventure does not deny, nay expressly affirms, that certain *effects* of God and the names signifying these effects cannot be said but *metaphorically* of God. Finally, according to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor it can be said, that even the names which *properly* convene God in regard to the *thing signified* (such as "wisdom"), are yet not properly to be attributed to God in regard to the *manner of signifying*, to the extent that not in that manner, by which we conceive them in this life, but through the manner they convene with God in the more eminent and more perfect, infinite degree. But this does not cause, those names to be transferred (metaphorical), except in an improper sense. For, as Richard rightly says (loc. cit., in reply to n. 4), « a name is not said (to be) *transferred* [translatum], except where there is a transferal by reason of the *thing signified* ».

II. Plura de necessitate et regulis translationis vide infra d. 34. q. 4. — De nomine Dei; *Qui est*, magnifice loquitur S. Doctor in Intinerar. mentis in Deum, ch. 5. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 49. m. 4. a. 1. 2. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 8. q. 1. a. 1 et 3; S. I. q. 13. a. 11. — B. Albert., I. Sent. d. 3. a.

II. For more on the necessity and rules for a transferal, see below d. 34, q. 4. — On the Name of God; "He who is", the Seraphic Doctor speaks magnificently in the Itinerarium mentis in Deum, ch. 5. Cr. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 49, m. 4, a. 1 and 2. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, d.

13. 14. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 6.

8, q. 1, a. 1 and 3; Summa., I, q. 13, a. 11. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, a. 13 and 14. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 6.

III. Quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 2. a. 2. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 2; S. I. q. 13. a. 3. et 6. — B. Albert., de hac et seq. hic a. 1; S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 56. et 59. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 3. — Richard. a. Med., hic q. 4. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 3. — Henr. Ghand., S. a. 32. q. 2, et a. 73. q. 2. seqq. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2.

III. In regard to the conclusion: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 2, a. 2. — St . Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 2; Summa., I, q. 13, a. 3. and 6. — B l. (now St.) Albertus, on this and the following question, here in a. 1; Summa., p. I, tr. 14, q. 56 and 59, m. 1 and 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 3. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 4. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st. princ., q. 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 32, q. 2, and a. 73, q. 2. ff. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII.

ARTICULUS UNICUS.

Quaestio IV.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 397-399.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXII

ARTICLE SOLE

Question 4

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 397-399.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

QUAESTIO IV.

Utrum omnia nomina dicta de Deo secundum substantiam dicantur.

QUESTION 4

Whether all names said of God are said according to substance.

Quarto et ultimo quaeritur, utrum omnia nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam. Et quod non, immo aliter, ostenditur:

Fourth and last there is asked, whether all the names said of God are said according to substance. And that (they are) not, nay (it is) the otherwise, is shown:

1. *Auctoritate* Augustini quinto de Trinitate:[1] « Illud praecipue teneamus, quidquid *ad se* dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas, substantialiter dici; quod autem *ad aliquid*, non substantialiter, sed relative »; sed Pater et Filius dicitur ad aliquid: ergo etc.

1. *By the authority* of (St.) Augustine in the fifth (book) On the Trinity:[1] « This chiefly let us hold, that whatever *regarding Itself* that most outstanding and Divine Sublimity is said (to be), is said substantially; but what (is said) *regarding something*, (is) not substantially, but relatively (said) »; but "the Father" and "the Son" are said regarding something: ergo etc..

2. Item, Boethius in libro de Trinitate:[2] « Deus est sine quantitate magnus, sine qualitate bonus, sed non est sine relatione relatus »: ergo relatio vere et proprie manet in Deo, ergo et modus dicendi relative.

2. Likewise, (St. Severinus) Boethius (says) in the book On the Trinity:[2] « God is great without quantity, good without quality, but is not related without a relation »: therefore relation truly and properly remains [manet] in God, therefore also the manner of speaking relatively.

3. Item, hoc ipsum videtur *ratione*, quia in divinitate sunt aliqua nomina incommunicabilia, ut patet in omnibus[3] personalibus; sed substantia est communicabilis, cum sit una in tribus: ergo talia nomina non indicant substantiam: ergo in divinis est alius modus dicendi quam secundum substantiam.

3. Likewise, this very (thing) seems *by reason*, because in the Divinity some names are incommunicable, as is clear in all[3] personal (names); but the Substance is communicable, since It is One in the Three: therefore such names do not indicate the Substance: therefore among the divine there is a manner of speaking other than according to substance.

4. Item, in divinis est alio et alio modo se habere, quia aliter se habet ad Patrem Filius quam Spiritus sanctus, sed non est aliud et aliud esse sive subsistere: ergo cum hoc contingat intelligere et intellectum dicere, necesse est, quod sit ibi alius modus dicendi et intelligendi quam secundum substantiam: ergo etc.

4. Likewise, among the divine, there is one and another manner to hold oneself [se habere], because the Son holds Himself to the Father in a manner other than the Holy Spirit, but there is not one and another "being" [esse] or subsisting [subsistere]: therefore since one happens to understand this and to speak of it understood, it is necessary, that there be There another manner of speaking and of understanding than according to substance: ergo etc..

Contra: 1. Omne quod dicitur, aut dicitur secundum *substantiam*, aut secundum *accidens*, quia substantia et accidens sufficienter dividunt ens;[4] sed in divinis nihil dicitur secundum *accidens*: ergo secundum *substantiam*.

On the contrary: 1. Everything which is said, either is said according to *substance*, or according to *accident*, because substance and accident sufficiently divide being [ens];[4] but among the divine nothing is said according to *accident*: therefore according to *substance*.

2. Item, omne quod dicitur, aut dicitur *per se*, aut *non per se*. Si *per se*, tunc secundum substantiam; si *non per se*, tunc ergo per aliud et in alio; sed omnia quae dicuntur de Deo, dicunter *per se*: ergo omnia dicuntur secundum substantiam.

2. Likewise, everything which is said, either is said *per se*, or *not per se*. If *per se*, then according to substance; if *not per se*, then, therefore, through another and in another; but all (names) which are said of God, are said *per se*: therefore all are said according

to substance.

3. Item, dici secundum substantiam et[5] secundum relationem aut dicit diversitatem a parte *rei*, aut a parte *modi intelligendi* sive modi dicendi. Si a parte *rei*: ergo in Deo est diversitas et compositio; si a parte *modi dicendi*: tunc cum diversus sit modus dicendi in hoc quod est *bonus* et in hoc quod est *magnus* et in hoc quod est *Deus* — quia si quaeratur: quantus est Deus? respondetur[6] *magnus*, non respondetur *bonus*; similiter si quaeratur: qualis est Deus? respondetur *bonus*, non *magnus* — ergo non tantum essent duo modi, sed etiam multo plures quam duo.

3. Likewise, to be said according to substance and[5] according to relation either means diversity on the part of the *thing*, or on part of the *manner of understanding* or of the manner of speaking. If on the part of the *thing*: therefore in God there is diversity and composition; if on part of the *manner of speaking*. then since there is a diverse manner of speaking in that which is *good* and in that which is *great* and in that which is *God* — because one is asked: "How big is God [quantus est Deus]?", one responds,[6] "G*reat*", one does not respond "*Good*"; similarly if one is asked: "What is God like [quails est Deus]?", one responds, "*Good*", not "*Great*" — therefore not only are there two manners, but even many more than two.

4. Item, quod[7] respondetur ad quaestionem factam *per quid* dicitur secundum substantiam et quantum ad rem et quantum ad modum; sed nomina relativa respondentur ad quaestionem factam *per quid* de Deo: ergo dicuntur secundum substantiam. Probatio *minoris*: Augustinus in libro de Doctrina christiana:[8] Si quaeratur, quid est Deus, convenienter respondetur: Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus.

4. Likewise, what[7] responds [respondetur] to the question made *through something* [per quid], is said according to substance, both as much as regards the thing and as much as regards the manner; but relative names respond [respondentur] to the question made *through something* concerning God: therefore they are said according to substance. A proof of the *minor*: (St.) Augustine in the book <u>On Christian Doctrine</u> (says):[8] If one is asked, "What is God?", one fittingly responds: "The Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit".

5. Item, cum quaedam sint in divinis, quae . . .

5. Likewise, since there are certain (names) among the divine, which . . .

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[1] Cap. 8. n. 9. Cfr. hic lit. Magistri, c. 3, in quibus verbis Vat. contra originale et mss., nec non ed. 1, posito *dicitur* pro *dici* et *ad aliud* loco *ad aliquid*, tum post *autem* tum post *relative* addit *dicitur*. In fine argumenti ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *aliquid* pro incongruo *aliud*.
[2] Cap. 4, ubi quoad *sensum* continetur haec propositio, in quantum scil. Boethius ibi ostendit, quod cum quis alia praedicamenta praeter relationem in divinam verterit praedicationem, cunta mutantur in substantiam. Quod si *verba* propositionis attendas, videntur sumta ex Augustino, V. de Trin. c. 1. et 5.
[3] Ed. 1 *nominibus* pro *omnibus*.
[4] Cfr. supra pag. 116, nota 6.
[5] Vat. cum cc incongrue et contra alios codd. cum ed. 1 *aut* loco *et*.
[6] In cod. V hic et mox post *non respondetur* adiicitur *quod est*, ac paulo infra post *modi* additur *dicendi*.
[7] Codd. P Q *quidquid*. Ed. 1 cum cod. cc propositionem minorem exhibet sic: *sed per nomina*

[1] Chapter 8, n. 9. Cf. the text of Master (Peter) here in ch. 3, in which words the Vatican edition, contrary to the original and the manuscripts, and also to edition 1, having put the indicative *is said* [dicitur] for the infinitive [dici] with *substantially* [substantialiter], and *regarding another* [ad aliud] for *regarding something* [ad aliquid], it adds *is said* [dicitur] both after *but what* [autem] and after *relatively* [relative]. At the end of the argument, from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *regarding something* [ad aliquid] for the incongruous *another* [aliud].
[2] Chapter 4, where according to the *sense* this proposition is contained, inasmuch as, namely, (St. Severinus) Boethius shows there, that when anyone changes the other predicaments besides relation into divine predication, all the rest are translated into (the category of) substance. Which, if you attend to the words of the proposition, they seem taken from (St.) Augustine, <u>On the Trinity</u>, Bk. V, chs. 1 and 5.
[3] Edition 1 reads *names* [nominibus] for *all*

relativa respondetur ad quaestionem etc., ac dein ed. 1 nomini *Deo* praefigit *ipso*.
[8] Libr. I. c. 5. n. 5; secundum sensum. Verba Augustini sunt: Non enim facile nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conveniat, potest inveniri, nisi quod melius ita dicitur: Trinitas haec, unus Deus ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia; ita Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus etc.

[omnibus].
[4] Cf. above d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, page 116, footnote 6.
[5] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc, incongruously and contrary to the other codices, together with edition 1, reads *either* [aut] in place of *and* [et].
[6] In codex V there is here and next after *one dos not respond* [non respondetur] adds *That which is* [quod est], and a little below this after *manners* [modi] adds *of speaking* [dicendi].
[7] Codices P and Q read *whatever* [quidquid]. Edition 1, together with codex cc exhibit the minor in this manner: *but through relative names one responds to the question* etc. [sed per nomina relative respondetur ad quaestionem etc], and then edition 1 adds to the noun *God* [Deo] *Himself* [ipso].
[8] Book I, ch. 5, n. 5; according to the sense. The words of (St.) Augustine are: For not easily can there be found a name, which befits so great an Excellence, unless that which is thus better said: This Trinity, the One God out of Whom all (have their being), through Whom all (made), in Whom all (remain in being); thus the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit etc..

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p. 398

non dicuntur secundum substantiam nec[1] secundum relationem, ut hoc nomen *incarnatus*, hoc nomen *ingentius*, videtur quod ista divisio non complectatur omnia nomina divina.

are not said according to substance nor[1] according to relation, such as this name "*incarnate*", (and) this name "*unbegotten*", it seems that that division does not comprise all the Divine Names.

CONCLUSIO.

Non omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo secundum substantiam, sed quaedam etiam per modum quantitatis vel qualitatis et insuper quaedam secundum relationem.

CONCLUSION

Not all names are said of God according to the Substance, but certain ones even through the manner of quantity and/or quality and, in addition, certain ones according to relation.

R**ESPONDEO:** Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod est *dici diversimode* secundum triplicem differentiam.

I **RESPOND:** For an understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted, that a *diverse manner of being spoken of* [dici diversimode] is according to a threefold difference.

Uno modo *dici diversimode* attenditur secundum diversum modum *essendi*, qui est *per se* et *per accidens*: et hoc quidem modo non est dici diversimode in divinis, quia ista diversitas modi ponit diversitatem essentialem[2] in re dicta; et quantum ad hoc unus solusmodus dicendi est in Deo. Nam omnia quae dicuntur de Deo, sunt ipse Deus et eius substantia.

In one manner *a diverse manner of being spoken of* is attained according to the diverse manner of *being* [diversum modum essendi], which is *per se* and *per accidens*: and indeed in this manner there is no *diverse manner of being spoken of* among the divine, because that diversity of manner posits an essential[2] diversity in the thing said; and, as much as regards this, there is only one manner of speaking in God. For all (the Names) which are said of God, are God Himself and His Substance.

Alio modo *dici diversimode* est secundum

In another manner a *diverse manner of*

diversum modum *intelligendi*, qui quidem attenditur secundum aliam et aliam rationem sive medium[3] cognoscendi; et sic non tantum est dici *diversimode* in nominibus divinis, immo *omnimode*, quia Deus non tantum cognoscitur per diversa, immo per omnia rerum genera, et sic nomina dicta de Deo, quaedam dicuntur per modum *substantiae*, ut Deus; quaedam per modum *quantitatis*, ut magnus;[4] quaedam per modum *qualitatis*, ut bonus; et sic de aliis omnibus.

being spoken of is according to a diverse manner of *being understood*, which indeed is attained according to one and another reckoning or medium[3] of cognizing; and in this manner not only is there a *diverse manner* of being spoken of among the Divine Names, nay *an omnimodal* one, because God is not only cognized through diverse (Names), nay through all genera of things, and in this manner the Names said of God, certain ones are said through the manner of *substance*, such as “God”; certain ones through the manner of *quantity*, such as “Great”;[4] certain ones through the manner of *quality*, such as “Good”; and in the same manner concerning all the others.

Tertio modo *dici diversimode* est secundum diversum modum *se habendi*; quod[5] quidem attenditur quantum ad *absolutum* et ad *comparatum* sive relatum; et hic quidem modus diveritatis *minor* est quam primus, et *maior* quam secundum. *Minor* quam primus, quia secundum primum attenditur diversitas essentialis et compositio; *maior* quam secundus, quia secundum illum nulla[6] omnino attenditur in re distinctio. Secundum autem istum modum attenditur in eo unitas et pluralitas: unitas secundum absolutum, pluralitas secundum respectum. Et quantum ad hunc modus sunt solum duo modi dicendi, scilicet secundum *substantiam*, ut illa quae dicuntur ad se,[7] et secundum *relationem*, ut illa quae dicuntur ad aliquid. Quia vero haec non dicunt alium modum *essendi*, ideo haec praedicantur de illis et sunt unum; et quia dicunt alium modum *se habendi*, ideo secundum illa unitas, secundum haec pluralitas.[8] Ex his patent obiecta.

In the third manner a *diverse manner of being spoken of* is according to a diverse manner of *being regarded* [se habendi]; which[5] indeed is attained as much as regards *absolute* (being) and as regards *compared* or related (being); and indeed this manner of diversity is *less* than the first (manner), and *greater* than the second. *Less* than the first, because according to the first there is attained an essential diversity and composition; *greater* than the second, because according to that there is attained entirely no[6] distinction in the thing. But according to this (third) manner there is attained in this (manner) a unity and plurality: a unity according to (what is) absolute, a plurality according to (what is) looked-back-to. And as much as regards this manner there are only two manners of speaking, namely, according to *substance*, such as those which are said regarding (the thing) itself,[7] and according to *relation*, such as those which are said regarding something. However, because these (Names) do not mean another manner of *being*, for that reason these are predicated of the former and are one; and because they mean another manner of *being regarded*, for that reason according to the former (one speaks of) a unity, according to the latter a plurality.[8] From these (arguments) the objections are clear.

1. Quod enim obiicitur, quod omne quod dicitur, dicitur secundum substantiam vel secundum accidens; dicendum, quod in divinis habet instantiam, ubi relatio non est accidens, nec tamen dicitur secundum

1. For because there is objected, that everything which is said, is said according to substance and/or according to accident; it must be said, that among the divine (the objection) has an instance, where a relation

substantiam.

is not an accident, nor yet is said according to substance.

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur secundo, quod omne quod dicitur in divinis, est ens per se; dicendum, quod verum est, sed tamen non sequitur: dicitur ut ens per se, ergo secundum substantiam, quia non dicitur: ut nomen dici secundum *substantiam*, ut *substantia* dicitur *per se*, sed ut dicitur *ad se*.[9]

2. To that which is objected second, that everything which is said among the divine, is a per se being [ens per se]; it must be said, that it is true, but yet there does not follow: 'it is said as a per se being, therefore (it is said) according to substance', because there is not said: "that a name is said according to *substance*", such that *the substance* is said *through itself* [per se], but such that it is said *regarding itself* [ad se].[9]

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, qualis sit haec diversitas, aut secundum rem, aut secundum modum intelligendi; dicendum, quod secundum modum *se*[10] *habendi*, qui non tantum est in nostro intellectu, sed etiam in re.

3. To that which is objected, of what kind is this diversity, either according to thing, or according to the manner of being understood; it must be said, that (it is) according to a manner of *being regarded* [se habendi],[10] which is not only in our intellect, but also in the thing.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur quarto, quod nomina relativa respondentur ad interrogationem factam de substantia; dicendum, quod substantia dicitur dupliciter: aut ens *per se*, aut *ad se*.[11] Si ut ens *per se*, sic omnia et relativa et absoluta dicunt in Deo substantiam; et quia hoc modo *substantia* respondetur ad quaestionem factam per *quid*, ideo omnia possunt responderi. Si autem dicatur substantia ut ens *absolutum*, non comparatum, sic dicitur secundum subtantiam, quod dicitur *ad se*. Et sic non[12] . . .

4. To that which is objected fourth, that relative names respond [respondetur] to the interrogation made concerning substance; it must be said, that "substance" is said in a twofold manner: either (as) "a *per se* being", or (as) " a (being) *regarding itself* [ad se].[11] If as a *per se* (being), thus all (names) both relative and absolute, mean in God the Substance; and because in this manner "*substance*" responds to the question made through "*What?*" [per quid], for that reason all (names) can respond. But if "substance" be said as an *absolute* being [ens absolutum], not as one compared, in this manner what is said *regarding itself*, is said according to substance. And in this manner (St.) Augustine does not[12]. . .

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[1] Plures codd. ut A I K M S etc., contradicente contextu, *sed* loco *nec*; Vat. cum paucis mss. *sed nec*; ceteri mss. cum ed. 1 exhibent lectionem in textum receptam. Mox post *incarnatus* codd. O X addunt *et*, ac dein plures mss. ut A F H T V etc. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 *complectitur* pro *complectatur*.

[2] Cod. R *essendi* loco *essentialem*. Mox pauci codd. ut F O X *de Deo* pro *in Deo*. — Cfr. Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 13. (IV. c. 7.).

[3] Sic plures et quidem bonae notae codd. ut A G H K R T V W ee ff cum ed. 1, dum Vat. habet *modum*.

[4] Vat. praeter fidem fere omnium mss. et ed. 1 perperam omittit *quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut magnus*.

[5] Codd. I O Z cum ed. 1 *qui*. Mox cod. R *relativum* pro *relatum*.

[6] In Vat. substituitur *non* pro *nulla*, sed minus apte et contra fere omnes codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3.

[1] Very many codices, such as A I K M S etc., contradicting the context, have *but* [sed] in place of *nor* [nec]; the Vatican edition together with a few manuscripts, reads *but neither* [sed nec]; all the other manuscripts together with edition 1 exhibit the reading received in the text. Next after *"incarnate"* [incarnatus] codices O and X add *and* [et], and then very many manuscripts, such as A F H T V etc., together with editions 1, 2, 3, and 6, has the indicative, rather than the subjunctive mood of the verb *comprise* [complectitur].

[2] Codex R reads *a diversity of being* [diversitatem esendi] for *an essential diversity* [diversitatem essentialem]. Next a few codices, such as F O and X, have *concerning God* [de Deo] for *in God* [in Deo]. — Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 13 (Bk. IV, ch. 7).

[3] Thus very many and indeed the better known

[7] Indebita omissio verborum *ut illa quae dicuntur*, quae habetur in Vat., resarcitur ope mss. et ed. 1. Mox aliqui codd. cum ed. 1 *Quae quia*, aliquid vero *Quia quod*, pauci *Quia* pro *Quia vero haec*, quod ceteri cum Vat. exhibent.

[8] Communissima lectio mss. et sex primarum edd., in qua, transpositis verbis *illa* et *haec* (aliqui codd. ut A H I K cum edd. 2, ,3 4, 5, 6 *hoc*), habetur *secundum haec unitas, secundum illa pluralitas*, contextu ut reiicienda comprobatur.

[9] Sensus est: in hac propositione *nomen dici secundum substantiam*, verba *secundum substantiam* non sumuntur in eo sensu, quo per substantiam intelligitur *ens per se*, sed *ens ad se*, ideoque relationes divinae, licet sint *per se*, non vero *ad se*, non secundum substantiam dicuntur. Vide paulo infra ad 4.

[10] Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 restituimus perperam omissum *se*. Paulo ante cod. V *quaeritur* pro *obiicitur*.

[11] Plures codd. ut F M X Y Z cum ed. 1 duplex hoc membrum ita exhibent: *aut ens per se aut ens per se et ad se*. Paulo ante cod. I *quod per nomina relativa respondetur* loco *quod nomina relativa respondentur*, et cod. K *quaestionem* pro *interrogationem*. Mox fide antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 posuimus *sic* pro *tunc*. Dein cod. S *dicuntur in Deo secundum substantiam* loco *dicunt in Deo substantiam*.

[12] Fere omnes codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3 omittunt *non*, sed male, ut ex contextu patet. Mox ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus *nomina*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc omittit et pro quo cod. S ponit *omnia*.

codices, such as A G H K R T V W ee and ff, together with edition 1, while the Vatican edition has *manner* [modum].

[4] The Vatican edition, not trusting in nearly all the manuscripts and edition 1, faultily omits *certain ones through the manner of quantity, such as "Great"* [quaedam per modum quantitatis, ut magnus].

[5] Codices I O and Z, together with edition 1, read *which (manner)* [qui] instead of *which (diverse manner of speaking)* [quod]. Next codex R reads *relative* [relativum] for *related* [relatum].

[6] In the Vatican edition there is substituted *no* [non] for *no* [non], but less aptly and contrary to nearly all the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3.

[7] The undue omission of the words *such as those which are said* [ut illa quae dicuntur], which omission is had in the Vatican edition, is repaired with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1. Next some codices, together with edition 1, have *Which because* [Quae quia], another has *Because which* [Quia quod], a few have *Because* [Quia] for *However, because these (names)* [Quia vero haec], which all the others, together with the Vatican edition, exhibit.

[8] The most common reading of the manuscripts and the six first editions, in which, with the words *the former* [illa] and *the latter* [haec] (some codices, such as A H I and K, together with editions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, have *this* [hoc]) transposed, there is had *according to latter unity, according to the former plurality*, is proved from the context to be rejected.

[9] The sense is: in this proposition '*that a name be said according to substance*', the words *according to substance* are not taken in that sense, whereby through "substance" there is understood "*a per se being*" [ens per se], but rather "a *being regarding itself*" [ens ad se], and for that reason the Divine Relations, though they are *per se*, but not *regarding themselves* [ad se], are not said according to substance. See a little below this, in reply to n. 4.

[10] From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, we have restored the faultily omitted <u>se</u> [se]. A little before this codex V has *is asked* [quaeritur] for *is objected* [obiicitur].

[11] Very many codices, such as F M X Y Z, together with edition 1, this twofold member thus: *either a per se being or a per se and ad se being* [au tens per se au tens per se et ad se]. A little before this codex I has *that through relative names one responds* [quod per nomina relativa respondetur] in place of *that relative names respond* [quod nomina relativa respondentur], and codex K has *question* [quaestionem] for *interrogation* [interrogationem]. Next, trusting in the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1, we have placed *thus* [sic] for *then* [tunc]. Then codex S has *are said in God according to substance* [dicuntur in Deo secundum substantiam] in place of *mean in God the Substance* [dicunt in Deo substantiam].

[12] Nearly all the codices, together with editions 1, 2, and 3, omit *not* [non], but badly, as is clear from the context. Next (on the following page), from the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have supplied *names* [nomina], which the Vatican edition together with codex cc omits, and instead of which codex X reads

all relatives [omnia relativa] for *relative names* [nomina relativa].

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p. 399

accipit Augustinus; et sic Pater et Filius, et nomina relativa secundum substantiam non dicuntur.

accept it; and in this manner “the Father” and “the Son”, and relative names are not said according to substance.

5. Ad illud quod ultimo obiicitur, quod multa dicuntur de Deo, quae non dicuntur secundum substantiam nec secundum relationem; dicendum, quod *dici relative* in divinis poetst esse dupliciter. Quaedam enim nomina dicuntur relative ex *principali* nominis *intellectu*, quaedam ex *consequenti*.

5. To that which is objected last, that many (names) are said of God, which are not said according to substance nor according to relation; it must be said, that *being spoken of in a relative manner* among the divine can be in a twofold manner. For certain names are said relatively out of *the principal understanding* of the name, certain ones out of the *consequent (understanding of it)*.

Et[1] prima differentia dividitur in tres: quia quaedam significant relationem et *dicuntur relative*, ut Pater; quaedam significant relationem,[2] ut paternitas, quae *non dicitur ad alterum*, sed est ipsum quo alterum refertur; quaedam dicuntur relative, quia *privant relationem*, ut ingenitus, improcessibilis; tamen ista non est privatio pura, ut infra videbitur.[3]

And[1] the first difference is divided into three: because certain (names) signify a relation and *are said relatively*, such as “the Father”; certain ones signify a relation,[2] such as “paternity”, which *are not said regarding the Other*, but (which) is that itself by which the Other is referred; certain ones are said relatively, because *they deprive relation*, such as “unbegotten”, “unprocessible”; yet that is not a pure privation, as shall be seen below.[3]

Quae autem important relationem ex *consequenti* intellectu, similiter sunt secundum triplicem differentiam. *Quaedam* enim dicuntur dici relative, quia ponuntur pro relativis, ut cum dicitur: Deus generat Deum, id est Pater Filium. *Quaedam* dicuntur relative, quia claudunt in suo significato interius relationem, ut cum dicitur *incarnatus* — sensus enim est, id est carni unitus; unio enim dicit relationem, quae singularem personam respicit — sive assumere carnem et huiusmodi. *Quaedam* dicuntur relative, quia claudunt relationem in suppositis, ut similis et aequalis; non enim sunt similes, nisi qui referuntur et distinguuntur.

But those which convey a relation out of a *consequent* understanding, are similarly according to a threefold difference. For *certain* (names) are said to be said relatively, because they are posited on behalf of relatives, as when there is said: “God generates God”, that is, “The Father (generates) the Son”. *Certain ones* are said relatively, because they enclose [claudunt] the relation interiorly in their own signified, as when there is said “*incarnate*” — for the sense is, that “He is united to the flesh”; for the union means a relation, which respects a singular Person — or “to assume the flesh” and (expressions) of this kind. *Certain ones* are said relatively, because they enclose the relation in the supposits, such as “similar” and “equal”; for they are not similar, unless (they are) those which are referred and disinguished.

SCHOLION.

I. Pro statu quaestionis facilius intelligendo notamus, quod *substantia* sumitur duplici sensu, ut patet ex solut ad 2. Intelligitur enim vel ut res *per se* stans; et sic

SCHOLIUM

I. For an easier understanding of the state of the question we note, that “*substasnce*” [substantia] is taken in a twofold sense, as is clear from the solution to n. 2. For it is

distinguitur contra accidens, quo est in alio, et in hoc sensu est substantia quidquid est in Deo; et ipsae relationes non manent in praedicamento accidentis, sed transeut in praedicamentum substantiae. Vel substantia sumitur ut res absoluta sive *ad se*, et sic distinguitur contra relationem; in hoc secundo sensu intelligitur quaestio principalis, ut patet ex argumentis in fundam. Praeter hoc dubium etiam aliae quaestiones solvuntur. Quaesivit enim S. Bonav. supra (in divisione questionum), utrum nomina dicta de Deo dicantur secundum substantiam, an etiam aliquo *alio modo*. Quare hic primo loco explicat tres diversos modos dicendi de Deo et respondet ad quaesitum iuxta hanc triplicem distinctionem.

understood either as a thing standing *through itself* [res per se stans]; and in this it is distinguished against the "accident", whereby it is in another, and in this sense the substance is whatever is in God; and the relations themselves do not remain in the predicament of accident, but pass over into the predicament of substance. And/or "substance" is taken as the absolute thing [res absoluta] or *regarding itself* [ad se], and in this manner it is distinguished against relation; in this second sense the principal question is understood, as is clear from the arguments in the fundament. Besides this doubt, other questions are also solves. For St. Bonaventure asked above (in the division of the questions), whether names said of God are said according to substance, or whether also in any *other manner*. For which reason he here explains in the first place the three diverse manners of speaking of God and responds to the question according to this threefold distinction.

II. Ut melius intelligantur quae hic dicuntur de modo dicendi secundum substantiam et secundum relationem, haec ex Alex. Hal. (loc. infra cit. § 3.) notamus: « Dicendum, quod (in Deo) omnia praedicamenta mutantur, sed tamen dissimiliter. Alia enim praedicamenta a *substantia* et *relatione* mutantur dupliciter: secundum rationem sui *generis* et secundum rationem qua sunt *in creatura* . . . *Substantia* vero et *ad aliquid* mutantur uno modo; mutantur enim a ratione, qua sunt in creatura, sed manet secundum intentionem primam sui generis. Nam substantia, ut est in creatura subsistens sub accidentibus, non est in divinis; tamen in divinis est substantia ut ens per se. Iterum in creatura *ad aliquid* est accidens, quomodo non est in divinis; sed tamen in divinis est *ad aliquid*, hoc est ad aliud se habens, vel potius ad alium se habens ».

II. To better understand that is here said of the manner of speaking according to substance and according to relation, we note these (words) from Alexander of Hales (loc. cit. below, § 3): « It must be said, that (in God) all the predicaments are changed; but yet dissimilarly. For predicaments other than *substance* and *relation* are changed in a twofold manner: according to the reckoning of their own *genus*, and according to the reckoning whereby they are *in a creature* . . . However, (the predicaments) *substance* and *regarding something* [i.e. relation] are changed in one manner; for they are changed by the reckoning, whereby they are in a creature, but remain according to the first intention of their genus. For "substance", such as is in a creature subsisting under accidents, it not among the divine; yet there is among the divine a "substance", such as (is) a per se being [ens per se]. Again in a creature *regarding something* there is an accident, according to which manner it is not among the divine; but yet there is among the divine a *regarding something*, that is a 'holding itself regarding another', and/or rather 'One holding Himself regarding *Another*' ».

III. Attentione digna sunt quae hic in corp. et ad 5. de variis speciebus differentiae sive

III. What is taught here in the body and in reply to n. 5 concerning the various species

distinctionis et de nominibus relationem significantibus docentur. Cfr. supra d. 13. a. 3; d. 19. p. II. q. 2. ad 4, et praesertim d. 26. q. 1. Idem docet Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 4. 5.

of difference or of distinction and concerning the names signifying relation is worthy of attention. Cf. above d. 13, a. 3; d. 19, p. II, q. 2, in reply to n. 2, and especially d. 26, q. 1. Alexander of Hales teaches the same, in Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 4 and 5.

IV. Quoad conclusionem omnes consentiunt. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. — S. Thom., de Potent. q. 7. a. 4. 5; S. I. q. 13, a. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 14. q. 57. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 5. — Aegid. R., hic 1. princ. q. 4. circa med. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 32. q. 5. — Durand., hic q. 2. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 4.

IV. In regard to the conclusion all agree. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3. — St . Thomas, de Potentia., q. 7, a. 4 and 5; Summa., I, q. 13, a. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), Summa., p. I, tr. 14, q. 57, — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 4. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 5. — Giles the Roman., here in 1, princ., q. 4 near the middle. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 32, q. 5. — Durand., here in q. 2. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 4.

[1] In Vat. deest particula *Et*, quam antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 exhibent.
[2] In cod. X additur *et non dicuntur relative*. Paulo infra post *privant* cod. X addit *ipsam*.
[3] Dist. 28. q. 1.

[1] In the Vatican edition there is lacking the particle *And* [Et], which the more ancient codices and edition 1 exhibit.
[2] In codex X there is added *and are not said relatively* [et non dicuntur relative]. A little below this after *they deprive relation* [privant] codex X adds *itself* [ipsam].
[3] Distinction 28, q. 1.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM XXII.

DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION XXII

DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 399-401.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 399-401.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Dub. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo dubitatur de hoc quod dicit: *His addiciendum est, quaedam etiam nomina* etc., quia aut divisiones Augustini et Ambrosii sunt sufficientes, aut non. Si sic: ergo Magister superflue addit; si dicantur insufficientes, pro inconvenienti est habendum.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nec divisio Augustinis nec Ambrossi est diminuta; nec additio Magistri superflua, quoniam[4] membra divisionis Magistri includuntur in membris divisionis Ambrosi. Illa enim est per immediata; cum enim sit trimembris, reducitur ad has divisiones: quia omne nomen Dei aut est *proprium*, aut *translativum*; si *proprium*, aut spectat ad *substantiam*, aut ad *personas*. Magister autem ista membra magis specificat, quia nomen aliquod potest spectare ad unitatem *substantiae*[5] ab aeterno, vel ex tempore; similiter ad *personas* ab aeterno, vel ex tempore; et ad *personas* dupliciter: vel divisim, ut hoc nomen *Pater*, vel simul et coniunctim, ut hoc nomen *Trinitas*; et ita[6] sunt sex membra.

Doubt I

In this part there are doubts about the text (of Master Peter), and first there is the doubt [dubitatur] concerning this which he says: *To these must be added, that there are also certain names* etc., because either the divisions of (Sts.) Augustine and Ambrose are sufficient, or (they are) not. If they are: therefore Master (Peter) superfluously adds; if insufficient (divisions) are said, it must be regarded as unfitting [pro inconvenienti est habendum].

I respond: It must be said, that neither the division of (St.) Augustine nor of (St.) Ambrose has been diminished; nor (is) the addition of Master (Peter) superfluous, since[4] the members of the division of Master (Peter) are included in the members of the division of (St.) Ambrose. For the former is through (things) immediate; for since it has three members [sit trimebris], it is reduced to those divisions; because every Name of God is either *proper*, or *transferred*, if *proper*, either it looks to the *Substance*, or to the *Persons*. But Master (Peter) specifies those members more, because any name can look to the unity of the *Substance*[5] from eternity, and/or in time; similarly to the *Persons* from eternity, and/or in time; and to the *Persons* in a twofold manner: either dividedly [divisim], as this name "*the Father*", and/or together and conjoined, as this name "*Trinity*"; and thus[6] there are six members.

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[4] Postulantibus plurimis mss. et ed. 1, substituimus *quoniam* pro *nam*. Paulo ante in pluribus mss. ut A S T V etc. et ed. 1 desunt verba *Augustini nec*.
[5] In plurimis mss. et ed. 1 hic et paulo infra post *personas* omittitur *vel*, quod Vat. adiungit.
[6] Vat. cum uno alterove codice *ista* pro *ita*. — De conciliatione harum diversarum divisionum vide etiam B. Albert., hic a. 1. — S. Thom., hic q. 1. a. 4. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 5. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 3.

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[4] As requested by very many manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *since* [quoniam] in place of *for* [nam]. A little before this in very many manuscripts, such as A S T V etc., and edition 1, there is lacking the words *(St.) Augustine nor* [Augustini nec].
[5] In very many manuscripts and edition 1, here and a little below this, after *Persons* [personas] there is omitted *and/or* [vel], which the Vatican edition adds.
[6] The Vatican edition, together with one or the other codex, has *those* [ista] for *thus there* [ita]. — On the reconciliation of the diverse divisions, see also Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 1. — St. Thomas, here in q. 1, a. 4. — (Bl.) Peter of

Tarentaise, here in a. 5. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in a. 3.

p. 400

Dub. II.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *Trinitas est quasi collectivum*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia « unitas collectiva, ut dicit Bernardus,[1] est minima unitas; sed unitas Trinitatis arcem tenet inter omnes unitates »: ergo etc.

Doubt II

Likewise is asked concerning this which (Master Peter) says, that *the Trinity is a quasi collective*. For he seems to speak badly, because « a collective unity », as (St.) Bernard (of Clarivaux) says,[1] « is the least unity; but the Unity of the Trinity holds the citadel [arcem] among all unities »: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod hoc nomen *Trinitas* deficit[2] in duobus a nomine proprie collectivo. *Primo*, quia illa quae nomen collectivum colligit, habent simpliciter diversitatem; et *secundo*, quia habent unitatem secundum *quid*; sed[3] e contra est in nomine *Trinitatis*. Tamen in hoc est similitudo, quia sicut nomen collectivum plures simul dicit et de nullo per se praedicatur, ita nec hoc nomen *Trinitas* praedicatur de aliqua personarum, et tamen omnes simul importat; et[4] ideo Magister non dicit, quod sit collectivum *simpliciter*, sed *quasi*.[5]

I respond: It must be said, that this name "*Trinity*" falls short [deficit][2] in two (aspects) from a properly collective name. *First*, because those which a collective name gathers together, have a diversity simply; and *second*, because they have a unity secundum quid: but[3] it is the other way around in the name for the *Trinity*. Yet in this there is a similitude, because just as a collective name at once says many and is predicated of none per se, so neither is this name "*Trinity*" predicated of Any of the Persons, and yet conveys All together; and[4] for that reason Master (Peter) does not say, that it is a collective (name) *simply*, but *quasi*.[5]

Quinque Regulae de Nominibus Divinis.

Sciendum est igitur, quod illae quae proprie etc. Circa hoc notandum, quod ex verbis Augustini, quae hic ponuntur et in libro de Trinitate,[6] eliciuntur quinque regulae de nominibus divinis. *Prima* est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de Deo, dicitur secundum substantiam vel secundum relationem, excepto hoc nomine *homo*. *Secunda* est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de tribus personis, ita quod de qualibet singulariter, dicitur secundum substantiam,[7] exceptis nominbus partitivis. *Tertia* est haec: omne nomen dictum secundum substantiam praedicatur de tribus personis simul sumtis singulariter, excepto hoc nomine *persona*. *Quarta* est haec: omne nomen dictum de Deo respectu creaturae indicat essentiam, exceptis his quae pertinent ad minorem. *Quinta* est haec: omne nomen, quod dicitur de Deo ex tempore et non dicitur de personis singulis, praedicat *notionem* vel *quasi*; hoc[8] dicitur

Five Rules on the Divine Names.

It must be known, therefore, that those which properly etc.. About this it must be denoted, that from the words of (St.) Augustine, which are posited here and in the book On the Trinity,[6] there are elicited five rules concerning Divine Names. The *first* is this: every name, which is said of God, is said according to substance and/or according to relation, except this name "*man*". The *second* is this: every name, which is said of the Three Persons, such that (it can be said) of Any singularly, is said according to substance,[7] except partitive names. The *third* is this: every name said according to substance is predicated of the Three Persons together taken singularly, except this name "*Person*". The *fourth* is this: every name said of God in respect to a creature indicates the Essence, except those which pertain to (something) lesser. The *fifth* is this: every name, which is said of God in time and is not said of each

propter hoc nomen *missus*, quod dicit esse ab alio.

Person, predicates a *notion* and/or an "*as if*" [quasi]: this[8] is said on account of this name "*sent*", which means "to be from another".

Dub. III.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Non tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens*; quia cum dicamus[9] *tres potentes*, videtur quod pari ratione possumus dicere *tres omnipotentes*.

Doubt III

Likewise is asked of this which (St. Augustine) says: *Not three Omnipotents, but One Omnipotent*; because since we say[9] that *the Three* (are) *potent* [tres potentes], it seems that for an equal reason we can say that (there are) *Three Omnipotents* [tres omnipotentes].

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod verbum semper adiective et in adiacentia significat, et ideo semper trahit numerum a supposito, similiter participium manens participium, quia habet naturam verbi. Sed nomen, quia in quiete significat, aliquando substantivatur, et quando numeratur, tunc numeratur sicut nomen substantivum a parte sua formae. Et ideo, quia *potens* potest esse participium,[10] *omnipotens* est nomen tantum: ideo non sic recipitur, *tres omnipotentes*, sicut *tres potentes*, nisi *omnipotentes* sit adiectivum vel[11] adiective retentum. Ratio autem, quare *omnipotens* non potest esse participium, est propter compositionem, quam non admittit verbum. Participium enim, ut dicit Grammaticus,[12] transit in nomen quatuor modis: scilicet *compositione*, ut indoctus; *comparatione*, ut doctior; *constructione*, ut amans illius; *temporis amissione*, ut amandus, secundum quod idem significat vel[13] idem sonat, quod *amari dignus*.

I respond: It must be said, that a verb [verbum] always signifies adjectively and upon adjacents, and for that reason always draws its number from the subject [supposito], similarly (does) the participle [participium], remaining a participle, because it has the nature of a verb. But a name [nomen], because is signifies in rest, sometimes is substantiated [substantivatur], and when it is numbered, then it is numbered just as a substantive noun [substantive nomen] on the part of its form. And for that reason, because "*potens*" can be a participle (i.e. when it means "being able"), (and)[10] "*omnipotent*" is only noun: for that reason there is not received in the same manner, "three omnipotents", just as "*the three (are) able*", unless "*omnipotent* is an adjective [adiectivum] and/or[11] retained adjectively (i.e. as in "the Three are omnipotent"). Moreover, the reason, for which "*omnipotent*" cannot be a participle (i.e. by being rendered as "being all-able"), is on account of (its) composition, which does not admit the verb. For a participle, as the Grammarian says,[12] passes over into a name in four manners: namely, *by composition*, as in "untrained" [indoctus], *by comparison*, as "more learned" [doctior]; *by construction*, as in "the one loving that" [amans illius]; *by loss of time*, as in "the one to be loved" [amandus], according to which the same signifies and/or[13] the same sounds, as "*the one worthy to be loved*" [amari dignus].

Dub. IV.

Item quaeritur de ratione ista Augustinis: Si est participatione magnus, ergo magnitudo est maior quam ipse, et ponitur ibi: *Deus non est magnus ea magnitudine* etc. Et videtur ista ratio non valere. Non enim

Doubt IV

Likewise is asked of this reckoning of (St.) Augustine: If He is great by participation, therefore greatness is greater than He, and he posits (this) there (where he says): *God is not great by that magnitude* etc. And

valet: iste est albedinie albus per participationem: ergo albedo est alibior vel maior[14] quam ipse.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod ratio Augustini bona est et fundatur supra ipsa nominis expositionem, quia *participare* est *partem capere*, et si partem capit, ergo minus est quam totum. Quod ergo obiicitur de *albedine*, dicendum, quod est *esse maius*[15] dupliciter; vel quantum ad *esse*, vel quantum ad . . .

that reckoning of his seems not to be valid. For (this) is not valid: 'that is white by whiteness through participation: therefore whiteness is whiter and/or greater[14] that it'.

I RESPOND: It must be said, that the reckoning of (St.) Augustine is good and is founded upon the very exposition of the name, because "*to participate*" is "*to grasp*" [capere] a "*part*" [partem], and if one grasps a part, therefore it is less than the whole. Because, therefore, it is objected concerning *whiteness*, it must be said, that there is a "*being greater*" [esse maius][15] in a twofold manner; either as much as regards "*being*" [esse], and/or as much as regards . . .

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[1] Libr. V. de Consid. c. 8.
[2] Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *differt*, quae et paulo ante, antiquioribus codd. et ed. 1 contradicentibus, omittit *Dicendum*.
[3] Vat. cum cod. cc solum *et* pro *sed*. Mox post *similitudo* pauci codd. ut A W Y *quod* loco *quia*.
[4] Suffragantibus plurimis codd. cum ed. 1, supplevimus *et*.
[5] Plura de hoc videsis in Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 66. m. 1. — B. Albert. hic a. 3.
[6] Libr. V. c. 8. seqq. n. 9. seqq. — Mox auctoritate vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *quinque* pro *quaedam*.
[7] In cod. H additur *ut Deus, potens, bonus, magnus et huiusmodi*; in cod. O autem post *partitivis* adiungitur *ut unus, aliquis; et distinctivis ut distinctus, distinctio, discretio*.
[8] Vat. praefigit particulam *et*, ac paulo ante ed. 1 voci *personis* praemittit *tribus*. — Easdem regulas expositas invenies apud B. Albert., hic a. 6. — Richard. a Med., hic q. 7. — Petr. a Tar., hic a. 6.
[9] Nonnulli codd. ut G T ee *dicimus*, et mox cod.Y *possemus* loco *possumus*.
[10] A codd. V X hic additur *et*.
[11] Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *et*, ac mox *tentum* loco *retentum*.
[12] Cfr. Priscian., V. Grammat. c. 11, ubi agit de primo modo, scil. *compositione*, et XI. c. 1, ubi de aliis modis, ac VIII. c. 10, ubi et de ultimo modo loquitur. — Paulo post supplevimus ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 *scilicet*.
[13] Aliqui codd. ut A S X etc. *quod* loco *vel*, ed. 1 *secundum quod idem et* pro *vel idem*, e contra cod. W omittit *significat vel idem*.
[14] Vat., refragantibus mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, omittit *vel maior*.
[15] In Vat. et uno alterove codicde male deest *esse*. Cod. T *quod esse maius dicitur dupliciter*. Paulo ante cod. X *sed si* pro *et si*.

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[1] On Considerations, Bk. V, ch. 8.
[2] The Vatican edition, without the authority of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, and 3, reads *differs* [differt] for *falls short* [deficit], which also a little before this, with the more ancient codices and edition 1 contradicting it, omits *It must be said* [Dicendum].
[3] The Vatican edition, together with codex cc alone, has *and* [et] for *but* [sed]. Next after *similitude* [similitudo], a few codices, such as A W and Y, have *which* [quod: which refers to *this*] in place of *because* [quia].
[4] With the approval of very many codices, together with edition 1, we have supplied *and* [et].
[5] See more on this in Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 66, m. 1. — Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 3.
[6] Book V, ch. 8 ff, n. 9 ff. — Next on the authority of the older manuscripts and edition 1, we have substituted *five* [quinque] for *certain* [quaedam].
[7] In codex H there is added *such as "God", "Powerful", "Good", "Great", and (names) of this kind* [Deus, potens, bonus, magnus et huiusmodi]; in codex O, however, after *partitive names* [nominibus partitivis], there is added *such as "one", "any", and distinctive ones, such as "distinct", "distinction", "discretion"* [ut unus, aliquis; et distinctivis ut distinctus, distinctio, discretio].
[8] The Vatican edition prefixes the word *and* [et], and a little before this edition 1 reads *the Three single Persons* [tribus personis singulis] for *each Person* [personis singulis]. — You will find the same rules expounded in B. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 6. — Richard of Middleton, here in q. 7. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in a. 6.
[9] Not a few codices, as G T and ee, read *when we say* [cum dicimus] for *since we say* [cum dicamus], and next codex Y reads *we would be able* [possemus] in place of *we can* [possumus].
[10] By codices V and X, there is here added *and* [et]. — [Trans. note : In this response, the argument concerns the structure of Latin Grammar and the formation of participles; which is not identical in English. The English translation here, therefore,

should be regarded only as an aide in understanding this argument, and not an argument not entirely coherent in regard to the English language. For in Latin the word for "noun" is the same as that for "name", and yet Latin names as "nouns" all the words that can be declined in cases, which includes adjectives. And thus a participle, which can also be declined in Latin, can be a termed "noun", when it is substantiated, that is, used as a substantive, or an "adjective", when modifying the noun it is adjacent to.]

[11] The Vatican edition, contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1, reads *and* [et], and next has *held* [tentum] in place of *retained* [retentum].

[12] Cf. Priscian, Grammatical Institutions, Bk. V, ch. 11, where he deals with the first manner, that is *composition*, and Bk. XI, ch. 1, where he deals with the other manners, and Bk. VIII, ch. 10, where he also speaks of the last manner. — A little after this, we have supplied from the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 *namely* [scilicet].

[13] Some codices, such as A S X etc., read *as* [quod] in place of *and/or* [vel], edition 1 has *according to which the same also* [secundum quod diem et] for *and/or the same* [vel idem], and contrariwise codex W omits *signifies and/or the same* [significant vel idem].

[14] The Vatican edition, breaking with the manuscripts and editions 1, 2, 3, and 6, omits *and/or greater* [vel maius].

[15] In the Vatican edition, and one or the other codex, there is badly lacking *being* [esse]. Codex T reads *that "being greater" is said in a twofold manner* [quod esse maius dicitur dupliciter]. A little before this codex X has *but if* [sed si] for *and if* [et si].

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p. 401

posse. Dicendum igitur, quod participatio subiecti attenditur respectu formae universalis; et quamvis ipsa sit tota in subiecto quantum ad *esse*, non tamen quantum ad *posse*, quia potest in aliis esse; Deo autem[1] nihil potest esse maius nec quantum ad *esse*, nec quantum ad *posse*. Et ideo argumentum Augustinis bene tenet, quod Deus nihil possit participare.

"*being able*" [posse]. It must be said, therefore, that the participation of a subject is attained in respect to a universal form; and although that is whole in the subject as much as regards "*being*", yet (it is) not as much as regards "*being able*", because it can be in others. But[1] nothing can be greater than God, neither as much as regards "*being*", nor as much as regards "*being able*". And for that reason the argument of (St.) Augustine hold rightly, that God can participate in nothing.

Aliter potst dici, quod argumentum Augustini bene tenet in his formis, quae natae sunt aliquid denominare per essentiam; et in talibus, quod est per participationem, reducitur ad illud quod est per essentiam; et quandocumque sic est, illud quod est ens per essentiam, excellit illud quod habet[2] ens per participationem. Si ergo magnitudo est magna per

In another manner it can be said, that the argument of (St.) Augustine holds rightly in those forms, which have been born to denominate something through (its own) essence; and in such, what is through participation, is reduced to that which is through an essence; and whensoever it is thus, that which is a being through (its own) essence, excels that which a being has[2]

essentiam, et Deus per participationem, necessario sequitur, quod magnitudo est maior quam Deus. Non sic est de albedine, quia non est nata se denominare nec de aliquo per[3] essentiam praedicari, denominando illud.

through participation. If therefore greatness is great through essence, and God through participation, it necessarily follows, that greatness is greater than God. Not so is it concerning whiteness, because it is not born to denominate itself nor to be predicated of anything through[3] (its own) essence, by denominating it.

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[1] Ex omnibus fere codd. et ed. 1 substituimus *autem* loco *tamen*.
[2] Vat. *est*, sed contra mss. et sex primas edd.
[3] Cod. G *quantum ad*. — Idem dubium resolvit B. Albert., hic a. 8, ubi tenet primam solutionem. Alex. Hal. S. p. I. q. 48. m. 4. a. 3. § 6. ait: Unde Augustinus (V. c. 10.) de Trinit. dicit: Quod cum dicitur *magnum* de creatura, ut de domo vel de monte, dicitur magnum participatione, et non est creatura sua magnitudo; sed cum dicitur *magnum* de Deo, dicitur magnitudo per essentiam, et ipse est sua magnitudo. Accipit autem hic *magnum* Augustinus, secundum quod est commune ad magnum dimensione et magnum virtute; nam in Deo non est magnum dimensione, sed magnum in virtute; ita etiam intelligendum, cum dicitur *bonus* et huiusmodi. Hoc ergo modo vult dicere Augustinus, quod dicuntur de Deo prorie huiusmodi nomina abstrahendo a modo, quo sunt in creatura etc. — Ultimam propositionem, quam S. Bonav. de *albedine* ponit, S. Thomas, hic circa lit. sic demonstrat: Rem albam dicimus albam, sed albedinem dicimus albedinem (non denominatur alba). Non enim quod est in causato oportet esse in causa eodem modo, sed eminentiori. — Vide etiam Petr. a Tar., hic circa lit.

[1] From nearly all the codices and edition 1, we have substituted *But* [autem] for *However* [tamen].
[2] The Vatican edition reads *is a being through participation* [est ens per participationem], but contrary to the manuscripts and the six first editions.
[3] Codex G has *as much as regards* [quantum ad]. — The same doubt is resolved by Bl. (now St.) Albertus (Magnus), here in a. 8, where he holds the first solution. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 48, m. 4, a. 3, § 6 says: Wherefore (St.) Augustine On the Trinity, (Bk. V, ch. 10) says: "That when "*great*" is said of a creature, such as of a house and/or of a mountain, "great" is said by participation, and the creature is not its own greatness; but when "*great*" is said of God, (His) greatness is said through (His) Essence, and He Himself is His own greatness. But here (St.) Augustine accepts "*great*", according to which it is common to "great in dimension" and "great in virtue"; for in God there no "great in dimension", but (only) a "great in virtue"; thus must it also be understood, when "*good*" and (names) of this kind are said. Therefore in this manner (St.) Augustine want to says, that names of this kind are properly said of God by abstracting from the manner, by which they are in creatures" etc.. — The last proposition, which St. Bonaventure, posits concerning *whiteness*, St. Thomas, here on the text, demonstrates in this manner: We say a white thing (is) white, but we say "whiteness" is "whiteness" (i. e. and not that it is white). For it is not necessary that what is in (something) caused be in the cause in the same manner, but (rather) in a more eminent manner. — See also (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here on the text.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.